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THE DISAPPOINTING HISTORY OF SCIENCE
IN THE COURTROOM: FRYE, DAUBERT, AND
THE ONGOING CRISIS OF “JUNK SCIENCE”
IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
JIM HILBERT*
Introduction
Twenty-five years ago, the Supreme Court decided one of the most
important cases concerning the use of science in courtrooms.1 In Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,2 the Court addressed widespread
concerns that courts were admitting unreliable scientific evidence.3 In
addition, lower courts lacked clarity on the status of the previous landmark

* Jim Hilbert is an Associate Professor of Law at Mitchell Hamline School of Law
and Co-Director of the Expert Witness Training Academy, which trains climate scientists
through a grant from the National Science Foundation. He would like to thank Professor
Peter Knapp, Professor Kate Kruse, and Professor Ted Sampsell-Jones for their helpful
guidance, comments, and encouragement.
1. See David E. Bernstein, The Unfinished Daubert Revolution, ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST
SOC'Y PRAC. GROUPS, Feb. 2009, at 35, 35 (declaring Daubert as “probably the most radical,
sudden, and consequential change in the modern history of the law of evidence”); Barbara P.
Billauer, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Under Daubert: The Fatal Flaws of
‘Falsifiability’ and ‘Falsification,’ 22 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 21, 23 (2016) [hereinafter
Billauer, Admissibility] (claiming the Daubert decision “would profoundly change the face
of scientific evidence in American courts”); David L. Faigman, The Daubert Revolution and
the Birth of Modernity: Managing Scientific Evidence in the Age of Science, 46 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 893, 895 (2013) (describing the changes ushered in by Daubert as “revolutionary”);
Erin Murphy, Neuroscience and the Civil/Criminal Daubert Divide, 85 FORDHAM L. REV.
619, 621 (2016) (“When announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1993, Daubert was
heralded as a watershed moment in the treatment of scientific evidence.”).
2. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
3. According to a popular, yet polemical, book at the time, the courts were overrun
with pseudo-science and fake expertise in the late 1980s. See PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S
REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 2 (1991) (“Maverick scientists shunned by their
reputable colleagues have been embraced by lawyers. Eccentric theories that no respectable
government agency would ever fund are rewarded munificently by the courts. . . . Courts
resound with elaborate, systematized, jargon-filled, serious-sounding deceptions that fully
deserve the contemptuous label used by trial lawyers themselves: junk science.”). For a
more thorough discussion, and critique, of Huber’s book, see infra notes 108-114 and
accompanying text.
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case for courtroom science, Frye v. United States.4 In the years leading up
to the Daubert decision, policy-makers and legal observers sounded the
alarm about the rise in the use of “junk science” by so-called expert
witnesses.5 Some critics went so far as to suggest that American businesses
and the viability of the court system itself were at stake.6
Despite the likely exaggeration of such claims, the law of the
admissibility of expert testimony certainly needed reform by the time of
Daubert.7 As the Court itself acknowledged, there was a circuit split on the
appropriate standard for courts to apply.8 Lower courts had been applying
inconsistent criteria and, for the most part, had ignored the nearly twentyyear-old codified rule of evidence on the subject.9 In addition, after a
century of the growth of science in the courtroom,10 expert witnesses had
4. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), overruled by Daubert,
509 U.S. 579. In Daubert, the Court held that Frye was superseded by Federal Rule of
Evidence 702, which governs expert testimony in federal courts. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.
5. In the early 1990s, “[t]he President's Council on Competitiveness, chaired by former
Vice President Dan Quayle, established a Civil Justice Reform Task Force” to examine the
perceived proliferation of unreliable expert testimony. Paul C. Giannelli, ‘Junk Science’:
The Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 105, 109 (1993). Vice President
Quayle became an outspoken advocate for reforming the tort system, claiming that
“uncontrolled use of expert witnesses . . . has also allowed ‘junk science’ to tarnish the legal
process.” Dan Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559, 565 (1992).
6. One leading book spared no hyperbole. See WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION
EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT 2 (1991) (“The
unleashing of litigation in its full fury has done cruel, grave harm and little lasting good. It
has helped sunder some of the most sensitive and profound relationships of human
life . . . .”).
7. Indeed, the standards of how expert witness testimony would be assessed had been
inconsistent for the previous 100 years or more. The variety of ways courts assessed the
admissibility of expert witnesses “became the crucible in which Frye was reexamined,
sometimes questioned, often implicitly modified, and occasionally rejected.” Mark
McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IOWA L.
REV. 879, 885 (1982).
8. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585 (“We granted certiorari in light of sharp divisions among
the courts regarding the proper standard for the admission of expert testimony.”) (citation
omitted).
9. See, e.g., Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Torts, Causation, and Scientific Evidence
After Daubert, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 889, 910 (1994) (evaluating cases and writing at the time
of the Daubert decision that “courts have been uncertain regarding the precise scope of the
Federal Rules”).
10. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic Competence, 73
BROOK. L. REV. 1009, 1009 (2008) (“In various ways, skilled witnesses have been used in
courtroom processes since just about the dawn of the jury trial. The expert witness in its
modern form—a witness whose presence in court results not from being a percipient witness
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become a prominent feature of the legal system, requiring courts to respond
to more and more questions concerning the admissibility of their
testimony.11
More specifically, however, Daubert was arguably supposed to address
the sort of junk science that had surfaced in the criminal case, Barefoot v.
Estelle, ten years earlier.12 In Barefoot, the Court allowed the testimony of
a psychiatrist regarding the future dangerousness of the defendant in order
to impose the death penalty.13 The Court did so despite clear evidence “that
psychiatrists simply have no expertise in predicting long-term future
dangerousness” and that “two out of three predictions of long-term future

to material facts, but instead because of education, training, experience, or other specialized
knowledge relevant to the case, and who is called by one party to testify, and is typically
compensated by that party as well—can be traced back to at least the middle of the
nineteenth century.”). According to Judge Posner, there is “a widespread, and increasingly
troublesome, discomfort among lawyers and judges confronted by a scientific or other
technological issue.” Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 787 (7th Cir. 2013) (Posner, J.). As
he explained, “[I]t's increasingly concerning, because of the extraordinary rate of scientific
and other technological advances that figure increasingly in litigation.” Id. at 788.
11. According to numerous studies, expert witnesses now appear in the vast majority of
trials. Remarkably, three major studies have each concluded that expert witnesses appear in
86% of cases. See Andrew W. Jurs, Expert Prevalence, Persuasion, and Price: What Trial
Participants Really Think About Experts, 91 IND. L.J. 353, 355 (2016) (finding that “the data
reveals that expert witnesses appear in 86% of the cases in the study, which is an identical
percentage as in two prior research studies”); Shari Seidman Diamond, How Jurors Deal
with Expert Testimony and How Judges Can Help, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 47, 56 (2007) (finding
that forty-three of the fifty civil trials examined in Arizona involved expert testimony
(86%)); Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1119 (finding that 86%
of 529 reported cases from 1985 and 1986 from Jury Verdicts Weekly involved expert
testimony); see also Anthony Champagne, Daniel Shuman & Elizabeth Whitaker, An
Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in American Courts, 31 JURIMETRICS
J. 375 (1991) (finding that expert witnesses featured in 63% of cases in the study); Daniel
W. Shuman, Elizabeth Whitaker & Anthony Champagne, An Empirical Examination of the
Use of Expert Witnesses in the Courts-Part II: A Three City Study, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 193
(1994) (72%).
12. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 916 (1983). As the co-founder of the Innocence
Project put it, “Many thought Daubert would be the meaningful standard that was lacking in
criminal cases and that it would serve to protect innocent defendants.” Peter J. Neufeld, The
(Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and Some Suggestions for Reform, 95 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH S107, S109 (2009).
13. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 924 (“Death is a permissible punishment in Texas only if the
jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability the defendant will commit
future acts of criminal violence.”).
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violence made by psychiatrists are wrong.”14 Justice Blackmun, who would
go on to write the Daubert decision, expressed serious concerns in his
blistering dissent in Barefoot as to “how juries are to separate valid from
invalid expert opinions when the ‘experts’ themselves are so obviously
unable to do so.”15
The Daubert decision did not, however, address Barefoot or discuss any
forensic science, for that matter.16 Since Daubert, courts have not used the
decision to reign in the junk science of criminal prosecutions.17 Instead,
with each new study unveiled in the twenty-five years since Daubert, the
legal community has had to repeatedly confront the reality that nearly every
method of forensic science is either of questionable validity or entirely
unreliable.18
More than just a failure of science, the inability of Daubert to address the
problem of junk science in criminal cases has undoubtedly resulted in

14. Id. at 920-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As Justice Blackmun explained: “Despite
its recognition that the testimony at issue was probably wrong and certainly prejudicial, the
Court holds this testimony admissible because the Court is ‘unconvinced . . . that the
adversary process cannot be trusted to sort out the reliable from the unreliable evidence and
opinion about future dangerousness.’” Id. at 929.
15. Id. at 929. Justice Blackmun was also particularly bothered by such lax oversight
from the Court given that it was literally a question of life or death for the defendant. See id.
at 916 (“[W]hen a person's life is at stake—no matter how heinous his offense—a
requirement of greater reliability should prevail. In a capital case, the specious testimony of
a psychiatrist, colored in the eyes of an impressionable jury by the inevitable untouchability
of a medical specialist's words, equates with death itself.”). Particularly troublesome was
that the psychiatrist testified that there was a “one hundred percent and absolute” chance that
the defendant would commit future acts of criminal violence despite having never examined
the defendant. Id. at 919 (quoting the transcript). Justice Blackmun, who had seriously
considered going to medical school and spent nine years as resident counsel for the Mayo
Clinic, was likely not terribly impressed with the methodology of the testifying psychiatrist.
See generally Stephen L. Wasby, Justice Harry A. Blackmun in the Burger Court, 11
HAMLINE L. REV. 183, 185 (1988) (detailing Justice Blackmun’s interest in medicine).
16. See infra notes 136-65 and accompanying text (discussing the Daubert decision).
17. See infra notes 166-79 and accompanying text (reviewing the post-Daubert case
law).
18. See Jane Campbell Moriarty, Will History Be Servitude?: The NAS Report on
Forensic Science and the Role of the Judiciary, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 299, 300 (“By not
requiring minimal standards for the reliability of individualization evidence, courts have
allowed the forensic science system to operate without any checks and balances and to
convict innocent people in numbers we can only estimate.”); see also infra notes 209-308
and accompanying text (reviewing studies on the continuing use of faulty science in criminal
courts).
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wrongful convictions, including some death penalty cases, like Barefoot.19
Of the hundreds of such individuals who have been exonerated since
Daubert, approximately half were imprisoned due to the use of faulty
science in their trial.20 Science in the courtroom has cut both ways for
criminal defendants. DNA evidence has freed hundreds, but roughly half of
those were wrongfully convicted because of defective forensic science in
the first place.21
Part I of this Article will address the history of expert witness admission
in the modern legal era and the important role of Frye. Part II of this
Article will explore what led to Daubert and the Court’s decision. Part III
of this Article will distill the meaning of Daubert and subsequent Supreme
Court cases and examine the many studies that have attempted to measure
Daubert’s impact on the court system. Part IV will discuss Daubert’s
limited impact on the criminal justice system, highlighting a few
profoundly disturbing examples of unreliable forensic science that currently
plague criminal courts. Part V will discuss potential options for improving
how courts admit expert witness testimony.
I. History of Expert Witness Testimony in American Courts
A. The World Before Frye
The use of experts in the courtroom is not a recent development. As
early as the mid-1800s, parties relied on expert testimony to make or defend
19. See Eric S. Lander, Fixing Rule 702: The PCAST Report and Steps to Ensure the
Reliability of Forensic Feature-Comparison Methods in the Criminal Courts, 86 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1661, 1662 (2018) (explaining that many defendants who were later exonerated
were inmates on death row or had spent decades in prison, and that some of the defective
science that courts allowed to convict them was “egregiously faulty”).
20. See Cynthia E. Jones, Here Comes the Judge: A Model for Judicial Oversight and
Regulations of the Brady Disclosure Duty, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 87, 118 (2017) (“Nearly
50% of the first 300 DNA-based exonerations of the Innocence Project involved inaccurate
forensic science testimony.” (citing Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic
Science: The Need to Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163, 172-96 (2007))); see also
INNOCENCE PROJECT, WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS INVOLVING UNVALIDATED OR IMPROPER
FORENSIC SCIENCE THAT WERE LATER OVERTURNED THROUGH DNA TESTING 1 (2016),
https://www.innocenceproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/DNA_Exonerations_
Forensic_Science.pdf (reporting that “more than 50% [of exoneration cases] involved
unvalidated or improper forensic science” as a contributing factor in wrongfully convicting
the defendant).
21. Of course, the actual number of people wrongfully convicted by faulty science
“must be considerably larger since evidence that could prove innocence is only rarely
available and preserved.” Lander, supra note 19, at 1663.
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their case.22 Science was becoming an indispensable feature in many legal
disputes.23 While Frye v. United States is often considered the first modern
case on the admissibility of expert witness testimony, 24 judges had been
evaluating expert testimony under at least two standards for the previous
several decades.25
One common test courts employed was whether the expert testimony
would assist the jury in understanding the facts of the case. Using a basic
relevancy test that in many ways modeled the current rule,26 courts simply
evaluated the helpfulness of the evidence to a lay jury and admitted the
evidence if it was relevant.27 Courts placed few limits on expert testimony,
so long as it was relevant to the facts of the case and the expert was
qualified.28 The basic question was whether the subject matter of a
particular issue was beyond the range of knowledge of the average juror,
and if so, whether a qualified expert's opinion “would be helpful, if not
essential, to the jury's determination of the facts at issue.”29 As one
commentator stated in 1880:
The practice of the courts is to admit the testimony of a class of
witnesses who are not supposed to have personal knowledge of
any facts or circumstances bearing upon a pending case, but on
the assumption that they are able from their special training and
experience to apply scientific tests and present to the court and
22. See Mnookin, supra note 10, at 1009.
23. See TAL GOLAN, LAWS OF MEN AND LAWS OF NATURE 52 (2004) (“By the end of the
eighteenth century, it was clear to the legal profession that in a growing number of cases, the
‘Best Evidence that the nature of the thing was capable of’ could be produced by science and
science alone.”).
24. See id. at 263 (“Although formulated in the radical context of the lie detector, it
embodied a general judicial state of mind, the fruit of two centuries of growing legal
dependence on, and frustration with, science.”).
25. See id. at 250 (explaining that at the time of Frye, “scientific evidence was mainly
evaluated according to the two traditional evidentiary criteria: the logical relevancy and
helpfulness of the evidence and the qualifications of the witness”).
26. David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please:
Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying About the Future of Scientific
Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1803 n.11 (1994) (“The ‘helpfulness’ element of
admissibility is still present today in the Federal Rules of Evidence.” (citing FED. R. EVID.
702 (expert can testify if it “will assist the trier of fact”))).
27. Id. at 1803 (explaining that the relevant inquiry was whether the testimony was from
an area beyond the knowledge of the average juror).
28. James R. Dillon, Expertise on Trial, 19 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 247, 258
(2018).
29. Faigman et al., supra note 26, at 1803.
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jury the import and value of such evidence as may appear, which
laymen could not be expected to comprehend and properly
estimate.30
Back then, another common test for courts was assessing “the
commercial success (outside of litigation) of the proffered witness in his or
her field.”31 Known as the “the commercial marketplace test,” courts
presumed that an expert was qualified if that expert could “make a living
selling his knowledge in the marketplace.”32 Courts admitted expert
testimony based on whether the expert had demonstrated professional
success in the expertise at issue.33 Courts generally did not articulate the
commercial place test, but rather implied it in their reasoning.34 An
expert’s qualification “was implied from the expert's success in an
occupation or profession which embraced that knowledge.”35
To the extent courts applied these standards, they were applied rather
loosely. If the court deemed the expert’s testimony relevant and the expert
qualified, parties had wide latitude to introduce the expert testimony as they
saw fit.36 This relaxed approach to expert testimony was part of a larger

30. Id. at 1803 (quoting John B. Chapin, Experts and Expert Testimony, 22 ALB. L.J.
365, 365 (1880)).
31. Michael J. Saks, Judging Admissibility, 35 J. CORP. L. 135, 136 (2009).
32. Faigman et al., supra note 26, at 1804.
33. Id. at 1804 (noting that judges would evaluate the qualifications and expertise of the
expert through “the expert’s success in an occupation or profession which embraced” the
subject matter in question); see also Saks, supra note 31, at 136 (explaining that judges often
inferred expertise from the expert’s commercial success). This practice goes back at least as
far as the Civil War. Id.
34. See, e.g., New England Glass Co. v. Lovell, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 319, 321 (1851)
(“[I]t is because a man's professional pursuits, his peculiar skill and knowledge in some
department of science, not common to men in general, enable him to draw an inference,
where men of common experience, after all the facts proved, would be left in doubt.”);
Buffum v. Harris, 5 R.I. 243, 251 (1858) (“[K]nowledge of any kind, gained for and in the
course of one's business as pertaining thereto, is precisely that which entitles one to be
considered an expert, so as to render his opinion, founded on such knowledge, admissible in
evidence.”); see also Faigman et al., supra note 26, at 1804 (“This is not a point that courts
made explicitly, but it seems to be implicit in the courts' determinations of who was
‘qualified.’”); Saks, supra note 31, at 136 (“The implicit measure of expertise seems to have
been how the expert witness fared in the commercial market for the witness's learning.”).
35. Faigman et al., supra note 26, at 1804.
36. See Dillon, supra note 28, at 258 (“As long as the proposed expert's testimony was
relevant and the expert was qualified, parties generally were free to introduce the testimony
of experts as they saw fit.”).
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judicial philosophy of the “sporting theory”37 where quality control was
exercised not by judges in excluding testimony, but by the parties through
cross-examination and the adversarial process.38 As Professor Jennifer
Mnookin puts it, “so long as parties had an equal opportunity to bring
forward opposing experts, under the same rules and with the same judge as
umpire, then whatever the jury made of the competing experts' stories was
acceptable.”39
By the turn of the century, however, every corner of the legal community
began voicing concerns about the open policy for admitting expert
testimony.40 Even a Supreme Court justice had earlier called expert
opinions “reveries,” arguing that they were as “effective in producing
obscurity and error, as in the elucidation of truth.”41 State supreme courts
also expressed serious concerns with experts’ partisan opinions and the
impact on trials.42 Public sentiment about the use of experts “produced a

37. Mnookin applies Roscoe Pound's account of the “sporting theory of justice” to the
nineteenth century evidentiary regime. See Mnookin, supra note 10, at 1015 (citing Roscoe
Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 14 AM. L.
445, 447-48 (1906)).
38. See Dillon, supra note 28, at 258 (“[P]utative expert testimony was freely
admissible and cross-examination served as the principal check against spurious claims of
epistemic authority.”). This was Justice White’s rationale for admitting the testimony of Dr.
Grigson in Barefoot v. Estelle. See 463 U.S. 880, 898 (1983) (explaining that jurors “have
the benefit of cross-examination and contrary evidence by the opposing party”).
39. Mnookin, supra note 10, at 1015.
40. See, e.g., GOLAN, supra note 23, at 255 (“[A]t [the 1897 New Hampshire Medical
Society] annual meeting, Judge William Foster opened his address with a joke popular
within legal circles: ‘There are three kinds of liars: the common liar, the damned liar, and the
scientific expert.’”).
41. McCormick v. Talcott, 61 U.S. 402, 409 (1857) (Daniel, J., dissenting). One year
later, the Court complained that “opposite opinions of persons professing to be experts may
be obtained to any amount” and that experts are often “perplexing, instead of elucidating, the
questions involved in the issue.” Winans v. N.Y. & Erie R.R. Co., 62 U.S. 88, 101 (1858).
42. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Hubbel, 97 N.Y. 507, 514 (1884) (stating that the expert
witnesses' “opinions cannot fail generally to be warped by a desire to promote the cause in
which they are enlisted”). An 1899 Wisconsin Supreme Court opinion fumed:
[S]killed witnesses come with such a bias on their minds that hardly any weight
should be given to their evidence. It seems that if a person is called as a witness
to support one side of a controversy by opinion evidence, he is quite likely to
espouse such side with all the zeal of blind partisanship, to view the situation
from the point of interest and necessity of that one side of the controversy with
such a degree of mental concentration as to shut out of view everything not
within that narrow focus, inducing a mental condition of entire incapability of
giving an independent, impartial opinion, and capability only of acting in the
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crisis of confidence in the courts.”43 They were “denounced in legal
journals and by the popular press . . . and lambasted for being partisan
‘hired guns . . . .’”44 The marketplace test was no longer a sufficient means
to qualify an expert.45
B. Frye v. United States–A New Test to Judge Expert Testimony
When viewed from this historical perspective, Frye v. United States46
seems like an inevitable move by the courts to place limits on the

line which the interest of the one side suggests, with as much certainty as the
hypnotized follows the mental suggestion of the hypnotizer.
Baxter v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 80 N.W. 644, 653 (Wis. 1899); see also DAVID H. KAYE,
DAVID E. BERNSTEIN & JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON
EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE, § 1.3, Westlaw (2d ed. 2018) (“It is amazing the number of
hard things which the courts of last resort have said about expert testimony; a volume quite
as large as the Illinois Statutes could be compiled of condemnatory phrases and language.”
(quoting Arthur J. Eddy, What Reforms in the Nature of Expert Testimony Are Advisable?,
58 ALB. L.J. 251, 251 (1898))); see also E. E. S. Wood, Medical Testimony, 7 AM. LAW. 92,
94 (1899) (noting that “cases condemning the value of expert witnesses and cautioning the
jury against paying much attention to their opinion, are so numerous that they form an entire
literature”).
43. Dillon, supra note 28, at 258. Indeed, perceived abuses by experts in the courtroom
and “experts' status as partisan witnesses placed them in adversarial positions that
undermined the public's confidence in scientific objectivity.” Id. As one lawyer wrote in
1899, the testimony of experts “is the subject of everybody's sneer and the object of
everybody's derision. It has become a newspaper jest. The public has no confidence in
expert testimony.” KAYE, BERNSTEIN & MNOOKIN, supra note 42 (quoting Henry Wollman,
“Physicians-Expert Witnesses.” “Some Reforms.”, 17 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 20, 20 (1899)).
44. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Idealizing Science and Demonizing Experts: An Intellectual
History of Expert Evidence, 52 VILL. L. REV. 763, 771 (2007). In an 1897 address to the
New Hampshire Medical Society, Judge William Foster reported that expert witness
partisanship “or inclination in favor of the party by whom the witness is employed, is
probably the most frequent complaint of all against the expert witness.” William L. Foster,
Expert Testimony – Prevalent Complaints and Proposed Remedies, 11 HARV. L. REV. 169,
171 (1897).
45. See Saks, supra note 31, at 137 (“One problem is that the market can tell us only
what people select; it cannot tell us whether what they select is any good. Thus, for
example, the marketplace test is incapable of distinguishing astronomy from astrology. The
market values both. Commercial value is not a measure of scientific or any other kind of
validity. Another problem is that some fields have little or no life in any commercial
marketplace. That is true of cutting-edge knowledge which has yet to develop a market for
itself, and of fields that have little or no function outside of their possible courtroom utility
(sometimes signaled by the adjective ‘forensic,’ as in ‘forensic science’).”).
46. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by statute, FED. R. EVID. 702, as
recognized in Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).
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admissibility of expert witness testimony.47 By the time of the Frye
decision in 1923, the problems with relying on merely the relevance of the
testimony or the reputation of the expert “led the D.C. Circuit to reconsider
the standard for admissibility of expert evidence.”48 In imposing a new
standard for courts to use when assessing expert witness testimony, the
D.C. Circuit started a slow but monumental shift in how experts were
handled in the courtroom.49 As Professor Jill Lepore explains, Frye “held
sway for seven decades, remains the standard in several states, and
continues to influence federal law.”50
Frye’s critical role in shaping the law on expert witness testimony,
however, should not obscure the compelling facts and history of the case
and the parties involved.51 The Frye case is named for James Alphonzo
Frye, whose appeal of his second-degree murder conviction was denied in
the famous decision that now bears his name.52 Frye had confessed to the

47. See Dillon, supra note 28, at 259 (“The D.C. Circuit's 1923 decision in Frye v.
United States was an early effort to constrain the free-for-all sporting theory . . . .”).
48. Andrew Jurs & Scott DeVito, The Stricter Standard: An Empirical Assessment of
Daubert's Effect on Civil Defendants, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 675, 682 (2013); see also Michael
J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s Formative Encounters with Forensic
Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1074 (1998) (explaining that the flaws of the
commercial marketplace test necessitated the Frye standard).
49. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993) (“In the 70
years since its formulation in the Frye case, the ‘general acceptance’ test has been the
dominant standard for determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence at trial.”)
(citations omitted); see also GOLAN, supra note 23, at 253 (explaining Frye “was accepted
for most of the twentieth century as the standard of the admissibility of new scientific
evidence in practically all of America’s courts” and its “exclusionary rationale [has] been
able to dominate American legal thought ever since”).
50. Jill Lepore, On Evidence: Proving Frye as a Matter of Law, Science, and History,
124 YALE L.J. 1092, 1096 (2015).
51. See id. at 1149 (“[T]he facts behind Frye reveal just how great has been the tension,
and how wide the gap, between ideas about evidence in history, science, and the law.”). Yet
as Professor Lepore laments, “Only a handful of scholars—historians of science—have ever
investigated the case.” Id. at 1141. Some have taken notice since, however. Professor
Lepore’s thorough history of the Frye case has been recognized as a must-read for anyone
interested in expert witness jurisprudence. See e.g., Dillon, supra note 28, at 259 n.31
(encouraging readers to review her “engaging history” of the particular facts of Frye).
52. Frye v. United States, 293 F. at 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by statute,
FED. R. EVID. 702, as recognized in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587; see also Lepore, supra note
50, at 1149 (recounting the efforts of Frye to clear his name of the conviction even years
after his parole, all of which were unsuccessful).
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police but later tried to retract his admission.53 The trial judge refused to
allow an expert witness to testify about Frye’s truthfulness in recanting his
admission.54 The defense was planning to call the expert to testify about
the results of Frye’s use of a “systolic blood pressure deception test” (an
earlier version of a lie detector test), which apparently verified the truth of
Frye’s story.55 The use of the deception test was the last viable defense
Frye’s counsel had available.56 Frye was found guilty.
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court focused entirely on the exclusion of
the expert witness and his deception test.57 In discussing admissibility, the
court recognized that "when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the
line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to
define.”58 Nonetheless, the court went on:

53. Lepore, supra note 50, at 1120. The trial judge had refused to accept the lie detector
test as sufficiently established: “When it is developed to the perfection of the telephone and
the telegraph and wireless and a few other things we will consider it. I shall be dead by that
time, probably, and it will bother some other judge, not me.” Id. at 1132 (quoting the trial
transcript).
54. Frye, 293 F. at 1014. In one of the more interesting features of the Frye case
backstory, the defense’s expert, William Marston, would later go on to write the Wonder
Woman comic strip. JILL LEPORE, THE SECRET HISTORY OF WONDER WOMAN 73 (2014)
(noting this detail is “[a]mong the many facts about the Frye case that have never been
discovered by anyone who has ever cited or studied it”).
55. Frye, 293 F. at 1013-14. Frye’s counsel had initially encouraged Frye to plead
guilty and had engaged the expert and his deception test to show Frye that his attempt to lie
would be detected. Instead, Frye passed the deception test with flying colors, as the machine
confirmed (in its way) that Frye was telling the truth. GOLAN, supra note 23, at 246.
56. Frye’s counsel was apparently desperate for any kind of defense. GOLAN, supra
note 23, at 246 (“Unable to find a single witness to support Frye’s alleged alibi, or a way to
discredit Frye’s detailed confession, not to mention the testimony of at least one eye witness,
[defense counsel Richard] Mattingly made a desperate though imaginative move and
contacted William Marston.”).
57. See Frye, 293 F. at 1013-14; see also Lepore, supra note 50, at 1124 (“[Defense
counsel] Mattingly and [Lester] Wood based their defense on establishing that Frye's
confession was a lie, and that, in disavowing it, Frye was telling the truth.”). The deception
test supposedly worked by measuring the subject’s blood pressure. See id. at 1113. “It is
asserted,” wrote the court, “that blood pressure is influenced by change in the emotions of
the witness, and that the systolic blood pressure rises are brought about by nervous impulses
sent to the sympathetic branch of the autonomic nervous system.” Frye, 293 F. at 1013.
The court characterized the deception test evidence as a “theory,” finding that “truth is
spontaneous, and comes without conscious effort, while the utterance of a falsehood requires
a conscious effort, which is reflected in the blood pressure.” Id. at 1014.
58. Id.
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Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a wellrecognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.59
The court ultimately ruled that use of the deception test “ha[s] not yet
gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and
psychological authorities” to justify its admission as evidence.60 Based on
this reasoning, the court upheld the exclusion of the evidence and Frye's
conviction.61
C. The Lasting Impact of Frye
The appellate court’s “cryptic” decision used only a total of 669 words
and did not make “a single reference to case law or precedent, nor any
references to scientific literature.”62 Despite these unusual features, Frye
became the default standard as state and federal courts around the country
began to follow Frye's “general acceptance” test.63 Indeed, the court
established a standard that still stands in numerous state courts.64 The Frye
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Lepore, supra note 50, at 1140.
63. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993); Bert Black et
al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert : A New Search for Scientific Knowledge,
72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 726 (1994) (“This notion of a special rule for scientific evidence
originated [with Frye].”) (citing 1 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §
203 (4th ed. 1992)).
64. See Barbara Pfeffer Billauer, Daubert Debunked: A History of Legal Retrogression
and the Need to Reassess “Scientific Admissibility,” 21 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 1,
11 (2015-2016) [hereinafter Billauer, Daubert Debunked] (describing how the “the ghost of
Frye still hangs heavy on the courts” as it is “still good law in eight jurisdictions at last count
(although the number is constantly changing) along with the District of Columbia”); see also
David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Again: The Past, Present, and Future of the General
Acceptance Test, 41 JURIMETRICS 385, 386–87, nn.7–23 (2001) (referencing the decisions of
seventeen states as supporting the assertion that “[m]any jurisdictions continue to adhere to
Frye” (citing S. Energy Homes, Inc. v. Washington, 774 So. 2d 505, 517 n.5 (Ala. 2000);
Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113 (Ariz. 2000); State v. Johnson, 922 P.2d 294 (Ariz. 1996);
State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152 (Ariz. 1993); People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1994);
Lindsey v. People, 892 P.2d 281 (Colo. 1995); Nixon v. United States, 728 A.2d 582, 588
(D.C. 1999); Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 1993); People v. Miller, 670 N.E.2d
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decision became “the controlling test for the admissibility of scientific and
technical evidence for much of the twentieth century.”65 By the late 1970s,
at least one state supreme court recognized that “[t]he Frye test ha[d] been
accepted as the standard in practically all of the courts of this country which
have considered the question of the admissibility of new scientific
evidence.”66
Yet a closer look at the legal history of Frye tells a slightly different, and
more complicated, story. While held out today as one of the most
important cases in all of evidence, much less expert witness admissibility, 67
the reality is that the Frye test “went unnoticed for decades.”68 Even Judge
Van Orsdel, the judge who wrote the Frye opinion, ignored his own ruling
in another important scientific evidence case he handed down on the very
same day.69 The Frye opinion did not receive a citation in any circuit court
721, 731 (Ill. 1996); State v. Heath, 957 P.2d 449 (Kan. 1998); Hutton v. State, 663 A.2d
1289 (Md. 1995); DePyper v. Navarro, 1995 WL 788828, at *34 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Nov. 27,
1995); Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 2000); Gleeton v. State, 716 So. 2d
1083 (Miss. 1998); State v. Carter, 524 N.W.2d 763 (Neb. 1994); Phillips v. Indus. Machine,
597 N.W.2d 377, 389 (Neb. 1999) (Gerrard, J., concurring); State v. Harvey, 699 A.2d 596
(N.J. 1997); People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 454 n.2 (N.Y. 1994); Commonwealth v.
Blasioli, 713 A.2d 1117 (Pa. 1998); State v. Copeland, 922 P.2d 1304, 1310 (Wash. 1996))).
65. Dillon, supra note 28, at 259; see also Lepore, supra note 50, at 1140 (citation
omitted) (“Frye's ‘general acceptance’ test wasn't meaningfully challenged until Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals in 1993 . . . .”).
66. Id. at 1140 (quoting State v. Miller, 732 P.2d 756, 759 (1987)).
67. See, e.g., id. at 1096 (describing Frye as “one of the most influential rules of
evidence in the history of American law”).
68. Saks, supra note 31, at 139. No federal or state court cited Frye for at least ten
years. Id. at 139. In fact, the only uses of Frye in the first three decades after the decision
were in criminal cases to exclude from trial “various lie detection and truth serum schemes.”
GOLAN, supra note 23, at 259. During its first twenty-five years, “Frye was cited in only
eight federal cases and five state cases. During its second quarter-century, it was cited 54
times in federal cases and 29 times in state cases.” Saks, supra note 31, at 139. But see
Bernstein, supra note 64, at 388-89 (“[T]he dearth of citations to Frye does not mean that
courts ignored it. First, some courts adopted the general acceptance test without citing Frye.
Second, Frye applied only to novel scientific techniques. There were few major advances in
forensic criminal evidence during this period that courts did not quickly accept.”); Black et
al., supra note 63, at 722 n.30 (“The ever-increasing use of scientific evidence is reflected in
ever-increasing citations to Frye. After World War II, the case was only cited 6 times before
1950, 20 times during the 1950s, 21 times during the 1960s, 100 times during the 1970s, 470
time[s] during the 1980s, and 350 times in the early 1990s.”).
69. Saks, supra note 31, at 139 (citing Laney v. United States, 294 F. 412 (D.C. Cir.
1923) (ruling on the admissibility of firearms identification)). The court in Laney “not only
made no use of the Frye test, it made no mention of it, and did not explain why it was not
applied or applicable to the novel question of firearms identification.” Id. at 139 n.23.
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case until 1984.70 Courts did not start using the Frye test regularly until the
mid-1970s, about the time of the codification of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.71 Heavier use of the Frye test, somewhat paradoxically,72 took
place after the Federal Rules were adopted.73 By the 1980s, “Frye was
being cited as much [on a yearly basis] as it had been in its first 50 years
added together.”74
At this same time, however, prominent evidence scholars reported that
“the (Frye) general acceptance test has been rejected by an increasing
number of courts, and attacked by commentators, who have labeled the test
Moreover, a leading state supreme court had that same year denied admissibility to firearms
identification. People v. Berkman, 139 N.E. 91 (Ill. 1923). As Professor Saks surmises,
“Perhaps Judge Van Orsdel foreshadowed later judges by using the Frye test merely as a
legal tool to be used or not used depending on the outcome desired.” Saks, supra note 31, at
139 n.23.
70. See Michael H. Gottesman, From Barefoot to Daubert to Joiner: Triple Play or
Double Error?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 755 n.11 (1998) (noting that “the first such appellate
decision appear[ed] to be Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 739 F.2d
1028, 1031 (5th Cir. 1984)”).
71. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595 (1975) (codified at FED. R. EVID. 702
(1975)). Rule 702, as originally adopted, stated that “[i]f scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” FED. R. EVID. 702
(1975) (amended 2011).
72. See Barrel of Fun, 739 F.2d at 1031 n.9 (“Although this Court has noted that it is an
unresolved question whether the Federal Rules of Evidence silently abolished or adopted the
Frye test, we have continued to utilize Frye's ‘general scientific acceptability’ criteria.”
(citations omitted)); see also David M. Flores et al., Examining the Effects of the Daubert
Trilogy on Expert Evidence Practices in Federal Civil Court: An Empirical Analysis, 34 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 533, 534-35 (2010) (“While the adoption of [Federal Rule of Evidence 702] did
not specifically preclude the use of the general acceptance rule in the evaluation of expert
testimony, questions arose about the continued applicability of Frye.”).
73. Saks, supra note 31, at 139. But see Billauer, Admissibility, supra note 1, at 29 n.44
(citing LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CHANGES IN THE
STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAUBERT
DECISION (2001), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/
MR1439.pdf) (referencing an empirical study that found that the “general acceptance” test
was used by courts only rarely (5% of the sample cases) between 1980 and 1993 and became
much more prominent after the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert).
74. Saks, supra note 31, at 139; see also Lepore, supra note 50, at 1096 (“On the matter
of expert testimony, few cases are more cited than Frye.”); id. at 1096 n.26 (citing Robert
Schriek, Most-Cited U.S. Courts of Appeals Cases from 1932 Until the Late 1980s, 83 LAW.
LIB. J. 317, 330 (1991)) (noting that Frye “is only one of two pre-1932 cases to rank in his
study”).
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‘infamous,’ ‘a sport,’ ‘archaic,’ and ‘antiquated on the day of its
pronouncement.’”75 The concerns about Frye rested on its seeming reliance
on the old “sporting theory” and the trust that the adversarial system was
robust enough on its own to protect the courts from unqualified science.76
There was also confusion among judges on these issues, which led to
contradictory Frye rulings in different jurisdictions concerning the same
types of evidence.77 Things were about to get more serious.
II. The Road to Daubert
A. The Rise of “Junk Science”
While contradictions were piling up in lower courts over how to address
the standards for admitting expert testimony, there was also a growing
perception that large cases involving complex science were overwhelming
federal courts.78 Vice President Dan Quayle wrote in 1992 that federal civil
75. Gottesman, supra note 70, at 755 n.11 (citing PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J.
IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 13-14 (1986)).
76. Mnookin, supra note 10, at 1016; see also Bernstein, supra note 64, at 390
(“Commentators began to attack Frye on a variety of grounds. Some argued that Frye was
too conservative in restricting evidence that had not yet received ‘general acceptance.’
Others were unhappy with Frye’s vagueness. The opinion does not define ‘general
acceptance’ or the ‘particular field’s’ boundaries, nor does it suggest whether the judge
should defer to the scientific community or use another standard to resolve these
uncertainties. Confusion among judges on these issues led to contradictory Frye rulings in
different jurisdictions concerning the same types of evidence.”). Indeed, some recent
scholarship argues that courts maintained a laissez-faire attitude toward gatekeeping until the
early 1990s. See JACK FISHER, SILICONE ON TRIAL: BREAST IMPLANTS AND THE POLITICS OF
RISK 222 (2015).
77. Bernstein, supra note 64, at 390.
78. These claims were certainly overblown. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Reading the
Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our
Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 71 (1983) (analyzing data
and arguing in 1983 that claims that America is experiencing a “litigation explosion” rely on
scholarship and analysis that are “thin and spotty”); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact
Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 442 n.54
(1986) (noting that “dramatic increases in litigation are hardly unprecedented” and
“empirical investigation suggests that the current preoccupation with the litigation ‘boom’
may be an overreaction”); Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1909 (1989)
(doubting the existence of a litigation explosion and noting in 1989 that federal judges had
approximately the same number of cases then as they had in 1960). But it is true that the
high point in the number of civil trials in federal court was in the mid-1980s, the period of
time when these claims were becoming pronounced. Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year
Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1264 (2005). Part of the
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litigation had almost quadrupled between 1960 and 1990, and that, in 1989
alone, eighteen million new lawsuits were filed, amounting to one lawsuit
for every ten American adults.79 One prominent study reported that a
“dramatic growth” in toxic torts and environmental litigation put unique
strain on the court system, which had to both adjudicate difficult legal
issues and resolve questions of new and complex science.80
The prime concern was the rising “epidemic of toxic tort cases.”81 The
emergence of mass toxic tort litigation in the 1980s allegedly resulted in
perception of a “litigation explosion” may have been fueled by the very real growth in the
number of lawyers. As the then-dean of Harvard Law School humorously opined:
In 1960, there was one lawyer for every 627 people in the United States. In
1988, there was one lawyer for every 339 people. During the last half of this
twenty-eight year period, the number of lawyers in the United States increased
at a rate that was more than five times faster than the rate of growth for the
general population. . . . I calculate that if we keep going in this way, by the
year 2023 there will be more lawyers than people.
Robert C. Clark, Why So Many Lawyers? Are They Good or Bad?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV.
275, 276 (1992).
79. Quayle, supra note 5, at 560. As with much of the data used at the time to support
the notion that the courts were overrun, the Vice President's statistics were immediately
criticized as inaccurate and misleading. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Taking Aim at the
American Legal System: The Council on Competitiveness' Agenda for Legal Reform, 75
JUDICATURE 244, 245 (1992) (reviewing the data and concluding that “its empirical
underpinning is shaky” and “at best incomplete and at worst misleading”). Despite his
reliance on shaky data, the Vice President made expert testimony a particular target of
reform. See infra notes 95–99 and accompanying text (outlining the history of the
administration’s reform efforts).
80. According to the study by the Carnegie Foundation, this “dramatic growth in toxic
torts and environmental litigation has put new pressure on the legal system, which is
simultaneously being asked to adjudicate issues on the cutting edge of science and to
develop theories of substantive law.” CARNEGIE COMM'N ON SCI., TECH. & GOV'T, SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY IN JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 10 (Mar. 1993) [hereinafter CARNEGIE
COMM'N]. The pressure is particularly “intense because of the large numbers of people that
are involved and the profound social, economic, and public policy concerns that these new
legal claims raise.” Id.; see also Bernstein, supra note 64, at 390 (“As debate grew over the
merits of Frye, the relevancy approach, and the reliability approach with regard to forensic
criminal evidence, courts faced a new evidentiary challenge—toxic tort litigation.”).
81. Billauer, Daubert Debunked, supra note 64, at 24 (observing that Asbestos and
Dalkon Shield were “the most notorious”); see FISHER, supra note 76, at 205 (detailing the
complex history of silicone breast implant litigation). Some of the increased litigation
stemmed from legitimate anger by the public toward large companies’ insensitivities to the
dangers of their products. Billauer, Daubert Debunked, supra note 64, at 24. For example,
“what inflamed the asbestos litigation were reckless statements by company managers and
reckless conduct of the early manufacturers.” Id. (citing Mealey's Litig. Rep.: Asbestos, July
27, 1984, at 982). In the 1960s, an executive for a company that used asbestos in its
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enormous payouts and unsurprisingly inspired “loud complaints from
industry and insurance groups.”82 Cases involving chemical manufacturers,
pharmaceutical companies, and health care workers received the most
attention, and everyone from industry heads to elected officials “argued that
the profitability and viability of production and manufacturing in the United
States were under serious attack.”83
The main complaint was that questionable science was leading to
erroneous jury verdicts. One paradigm issue was the silicone implant.
While no legitimate medical science ever substantiated any causal
connection between implants and serious health conditions,84 by the early
1990s six thousand plaintiffs signed up in state courts and four thousand
more in federal courts against the major corporations of the silicone implant
industry.85 Despite the lack of scientific evidence, the silicone litigation
became “an industry in itself.”86 By 1993 (the year of Daubert), “the four
products wrote a letter that was widely circulated and became the spark for many punitive
damages awards. Id. at 24 n.111. In the letter, the executive wrote, “My answer to the
problem is: If you have enjoyed a good life working with asbestos products, why not die
from it? There has to be some cause [of death].” Id. As Professor Billauer notes, “The
public had been sensitized to cavalier pronouncements by the ‘them that has’ and were
primed for revenge, and the plaintiff's bar took advantage of this societal state of mind.” Id.
at 24.
82. Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Trashing “Junk Science,” 1998 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 3, 6.
83. Id. Vice President Quale argued that “[t]he use of litigation as a preferred means in
our society for resolving disputes and achieving social reforms has burdened the courts and
has resulted in significant economic detriment.” Quayle, supra note 5, at 568. Industry
executives apparently felt the same way. See id. at 561 (“[A] survey of over 250 American
companies revealed that more than three-quarters of the executives believe that the United
States will be increasingly disadvantaged in world markets unless modifications are made in
the liability system.”).
84. In 1996, a judicially appointed National Science Panel found “that there is no
meaningful or consistent association between silicone gel-filled implants and any of the
conditions studied.” Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F. 3d 878, 882 (10th Cir. 2005);
see also Daniel Q. Posin, Silicone Breast Implant Litigation and My Father-in-Law: A NeoCoasen Analysis, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2565, 2571-72 (1996) (“Certainly, at the time the silicone
breast litigation explosion commenced (in 1990) there was no evidence that silicone breast
implants did any more than cause localized inflammation and tissue hardening.”).
85. Billauer, Daubert Debunked, supra note 64, at 24-25.
86. Posin, supra note 84, at 2571; see also In re Silica Prod. Liab. Litig., 398 F. Supp.
2d 563, 634 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (“[A]ssembly line diagnosing . . . is an ingenious method of
grossly inflating the number of positive diagnoses.”); Erica Beecher-Monas, Lost in
Translation: Statistical Inference in Court, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1077 (2014) (discussing
the admission of “highly suspect mass medical screenings by a few doctors for litigation
rather than treatment purposes” as specific causation testimony, often without challenge).
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major implant manufacturers jointly announced that they had collectively
set aside 4.75 billion dollars to settle claims filed over the next thirty
years.”87 And many companies would decide to get out of the implant
business altogether.88
The silicone implant litigation was only the tip of the iceberg, according
to the many critics89 who had by then embraced a new, powerful phrase
meant to get at the heart of the issue: “junk science.”90 That single twoword dysphemism became a rallying cry, made prominent in the bestselling book by Peter Huber, Galileo’s Revenge.91 Despite many
87. Billauer, Daubert Debunked, supra note 64, at 24-25.
88. Until protected by later federal legislation, some suppliers stopped producing the
material used in medical devices in order to avoid being sued. Phil Goldberg, Christopher E.
Appel & Victor E. Schwartz, The Liability Engine That Could Not: Why the Decades-Long
Litigation Pursuit of Natural Resource Suppliers Should Grind to a Halt, 12 J.L. ECON. &
POL'Y 47, 59 (2016); see also Posin, supra note 84, at 2572 (“Many of the large suppliers of
silicone and other related compounds, including Dow Chemical, Du Pont, and Dow Corning,
have decided to stop making plastics for medical implants because of the breast implant
litigation.”). The ripple effects of these decisions were potentially enormous. See Jack W.
Snyder, Silicone Breast Implants: Can Emerging Medical, Legal, and Scientific Concepts Be
Reconciled?, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 133, 136 (1997) (stating that “over 500 medical products
contain measurable amounts of silicone”).
89. Perhaps ironically, some of the earliest calls for a crackdown on questionable expert
testimony in toxic torts cases came from editorials in traditionally liberal publications, such
as the New England Journal of Medicine and the New York Times. David E. Bernstein &
Eric G. Lasker, Defending Daubert: It's Time to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 57
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 10 (2015) (citing James L. Mills & Duane Alexander, Occasional
Notes: Teratogens and “Litogens,” 315 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1234, 1234-35 (1986); Opinion,
Federal Judges vs. Science, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 1986), https://www.nytimes.com/1986/12/
27/opinion/federal-judges-vs-science.html). These editorials expressed particular concern
about “how bogus lawsuits were jeopardizing access to contraception, in particular after a
notorious case in which the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a $5 million award to a plaintiff who
alleged that his mother's use of a common spermicide had caused his birth defects.” Id. at 10
(citing Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 742-43, 747-48 (11th Cir. 1986)).
90. Most agree that the term “junk science” seems to have emerged in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. See Edmond & Mercer, supra note 82, at 4 (“It received its initial impetus
and articulation in the polemical works of Peter Huber of the Manhattan Institute, a
conservative think-tank supported by various industry and insurance groups.”). Former
Attorney General Dick Thornburgh, Attorney General under President George H. W. Bush,
offered his own definition. See Dick Thornburgh, Junk Science-The Lawyer's Ethical
Responsibilities, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 449, 449 (1998) (“I hold that ‘junk science’ in the
courtroom emanates from testimony by expert witnesses hired not for their scientific
expertise, but for their willingness, for a price, to say whatever is needed to make the client's
case.”).
91. See HUBER, supra note 3, at 2-3; see also Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo's Retort:
Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1637, 1642 (1993) (“Galileo's Revenge

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss3/3

2019]

THE CRISIS OF “JUNK SCIENCE” IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 777

questionable declarations and dubious science,92 Huber’s book was
embraced by policy-makers, lawyers, and the media.93 The rising problem
of “junk science” became a topic of mainstream public debate, as the book
attracted a great deal of attention.94
Huber’s influence extended to the administration at the time.95 The
President's Council on Competitiveness, which was chaired by Vice
President Dan Quayle, instituted the Civil Justice Reform Task Force to
target expert testimony.96 Vice President Quayle became an outspoken
advocate for reforming the way in which courts evaluate expert witness
testimony, claiming that “uncontrolled use of expert witnesses . . . has also
allowed ‘junk science’ to tarnish the legal process.”97 The Vice President
specifically, and inaccurately, used anecdotes from Huber’s book. For
example, the Vice President cites one of the most sensational examples of
“junk science” involving a “soothsayer” who, “with the backing of expert
testimony from a doctor and several police department officials,” won a
million-dollar jury award due to the loss of “her psychic powers following a
CAT scan,” without acknowledging that the verdict in that case was thrown

and its author have received heavy publicity and have been treated by lawyers as well as
laypeople as if they were part of legitimate scholarship on these issues.”).
92. See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text (cataloging the many concerns about
the data and assertions in the book by numerous commentators).
93. See Chesebro, supra note 91, at 1642 (“Galileo's Revenge and Huber's other
writings have been widely cited by lawyers, lobbyists, and even former Vice President Dan
Quayle, and have been glowingly reviewed by lay writers.”). The mainstream media was
particularly fond of Huber and his book. See id. at 1647 (“The lay press, for the most part,
has seen Huber as an unalloyed precious metal.”).
94. See Bernstein, supra note 64, at 391 (“A consistent theme of the book was that to
avoid the risk of being bamboozled by fringe scientists, courts should defer to mainstream
scientific opinion when reviewing scientific evidence.”).
95. See Jeff L. Lewin, Calabresi's Revenge? Junk Science in the Work of Peter Huber,
21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 183, 185 (1992) (“The administration at the time certainly took notice
of Huber’s work and relied on it for their own attacks on the growing use of courts for toxic
tort plaintiffs.”).
96. Giannelli, supra note 5, at 109. The Solicitor General at the time, Kenneth Starr,
chaired the Task Force. Id. at 109 n.24. To review this report, see PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON
COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA (Aug. 1991), reprinted
in 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 979 (1992).
97. Quayle, supra note 5, at 565. According to the Vice President, “‘Expert’ witnesses
regularly offer their ‘scientific’ opinions on the connections between automobile accidents
and breast cancer or environmental pollutants and ‘chemically induced AIDS.’” Id. at 566
(citing HUBER, supra note 3, at 4).
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out by the trial judge.98 Building on the Vice President’s efforts, “[t]he
1992 Republican platform included a promise to ‘throw out “junk science”’
from American courtrooms.”99
Courts, too, were getting in on the act advising against the use of “junk
science.”100 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit, in the decision later reversed by the
Supreme Court in Daubert, specifically cited Huber's book in rejecting the
testimony of plaintiffs' experts.101 But the larger issues for the courts at the
time were the perceived “attitude of judicial laissez-faire” when it came to
admitting “expert testimony from “just about anyone the plaintiffs chose to
designate . . . even persons without relevant training, credential or
experience.”102 Throughout the mid-1980s, courts “typically applied a very
lenient standard to the admissibility of expert testimony.”103 Equally
problematic, courts were applying different standards to toxic torts cases.
Some courts applied a loose “reliability test” to such evidence.104 Other

98. Id. But see Giannelli, supra note 5, at 108 n.16 (“Vice President Quayle cites this
example without including the next sentence. Huber's next sentence is: ‘The trial judge
threw out that verdict.’” (citing HUBER, supra note 3, at 4)). Instead, the Vice President
writes that such stories “are becoming almost commonplace.” Quayle, supra note 5, at 566.
99. Lewin, supra note 95, at 185.
100. See, e.g., Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 210, 215 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring) (“[T]he district judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting
the testimony. Perceptual psychology (a part of experimental psychology) is not ‘junk
science,’ and Professor Walker is no quack.”).
101. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The
best test of certainty we have is good science—the science of publication, replication, and
verification, the science of consensus and peer review.” (quoting HUBER, supra note 3, at
228)); see also Thomas M. Crowley, Help Me Mr. Wizard! Can We Really Have “Neutral”
Rule 706 Experts?, 1998 DET. C.L. REV. 927, 935 n.34 (“Given the circuit's opinion, and the
22 amicus briefs filed in the [later Supreme Court] case, representing a range of parties from
the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and Government to the American Tort
Reform Association (referring explicitly to junk science), the Daubert court was
undoubtedly aware of the larger societal issues at stake.”).
102. Billauer, Daubert Debunked, supra note 64, at 26; see also FISHER, supra note 76, at
222.
103. Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 89, at 4. Even when courts “purported to apply a
seemingly strict reliability test,” they usually allowed the testimony of the expert to be
admitted. See Bernstein, supra note 64, at 390 (citing, as but two examples, In re Paoli R.R.
Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990); DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 911 F.2d
941 (3d Cir. 1990)).
104. See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1246
(E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[C]ourts look to
evidence from experts in the field about the reliability of the materials in question . . . .”).
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courts applied versions of a relevancy test.105 Until 1988, no toxic tort case
applied the Frye test, which until then was nearly exclusively used in
criminal cases.106 By 1993, the year of Daubert, “the Supreme Court got
the message: [s]omething needed to be done.”107
Before moving on to Daubert, it is interesting to ask, were “the courts
really overrun with ‘junk science’?” “Not only are there no studies that
support” the allegation,108 but a Carnegie Commission report on Science,
Technology, and Government released at the time “concluded that, as for
the ‘allegations that “junk science” is flooding the courtroom, . . . many of
the concerns are greatly exaggerated’ and ‘it does not appear that the
federal courts are being inundated with fringe science.’”109 Huber’s
infamous book itself was heavily criticized as “junk science”110 and overly
reliant on anecdotal evidence.111 Huber and others’ use of junk science to
105. See, e.g., Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1536 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(“[T]he test for allowing a plaintiff to recover in a tort suit of this type is not scientific
certainty but legal sufficiency; if reasonable jurors could conclude from the expert testimony
that paraquat more likely than not caused Ferebee's injury, the fact that . . . science would
require more evidence before conclusively considering the causation question resolved is
irrelevant.”).
106. See Bernstein, supra note 64, at 390 (“Until 1988, no court applied Frye—which
was mainly limited to forensic evidence in criminal trials—in a toxic tort case.”).
107. Billauer, Daubert Debunked, supra note 64, at 27 (referencing personal meeting
with Chief Justice Rehnquist).
108. Chesebro, supra note 91, at 1653 (quoting CARNEGIE COMM'N, supra note 80, at 13).
109. Id. (quoting CARNEGIE COMM'N, supra note 80, at 13).
110. See, e.g., Chesebro, supra note 91, at 1726 (using Huber’s own terms in asserting
that “the errors in Huber's factual description and legal analysis are so frequent and profound
that Galileo would go further to repudiate Huber's book—on Huber's own terms—as ‘a
catalog of every conceivable kind of error: data dredging, wishful thinking, truculent
dogmatism, and, now and again, outright fraud’”); Edmond & Mercer, supra note 82, at 10
(criticizing the “limitations of the junk science model, focusing particular attention on the
simplistic, idealized, and frequently erroneous images of science employed by the model's
proponents”); Lewin, supra note 95, at 203-04 (“Huber harnesses the power of junk
litigation science to stir up fear of the tort system, purveying the pernicious myth that junk
science is rampant in our courts and that liability frequently is imposed without a wellfounded scientific basis.”); Book Note, Rebel Without a Cause, 105 HARV. L. REV. 935, 940
(1992) (reviewing Huber’s book) (“[I]t is imperative to disentangle Huber's two criticisms:
one evidentiary, against junk science; the other policy-oriented, against modern substantive
tort law.”).
111. Lewin, supra note 95, at 189. As Professor Lewin explains,
At the core of the work are over 100 pages of horror stories about the legal
system's mishandling of scientifically untenable claims that various persons or
entities were the cause of the victims' damages. Compounding the anecdotal
character of his evidence is the fact that, despite Huber's overblown rhetoric,
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promote reform “plays a strategic, rhetorical role in the agendas of many
who attempt to address the pervasive perception of an ongoing legal
crisis.”112 The use of the “junk science” rhetorical attack was heavily
subsidized by conservative forces.113 This may help explain why the focus
in the early 1990s of “junk science” avoided criminal defendants and
criminal cases generally.114
B. The Bendectin Litigation
In many respects, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals115 was an
ideal case for resetting the standards for admitting expert testimony. The
defendant, Merrell Dow, manufactured a morning-sickness drug,
Bendectin, that by the mid-1970s, was taken by 30% of pregnant women
throughout the country.116 This high participation rate gave rise to plenty of
potential plaintiffs alleging that this morning-sickness drug caused birth
these stories do not reveal a pattern of systematic judicial acceptance of junk
science, nor do they uniformly support his thesis that we face a serious threat
from junk science in the courtroom.
Id.
112. Edmond & Mercer, supra note 82, at 5-6 (“Junk science is a convenient scapegoat
for deeper law-science conflicts because it plays on public fears of science and technology
being out of control, while providing a rallying point for legal reform.”).
113. See Thomas O. McGarity, Our Science Is Sound Science and Their Science Is Junk
Science: Science-Based Strategies for Avoiding Accountability and Responsibility for RiskProducing Products and Activities, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 897, 905 (2004) (“[T]he Manhattan
Institute went to great lengths to publicize Huber's catchy ‘junk science’ claim in the popular
press.”); id. at 905 n.25 (noting that Huber's book “‘reached the public through a massive
publicity blitz’ financed by the Manhattan Institute” (citing SHELDON RAMPTON & JOHN
STAUBER, TRUST US, WE'RE EXPERTS! 223-24 (2001))); Edmond & Mercer, supra note 82, at
4-6 (describing the Manhattan Institute as “a conservative think-tank supported by various
industry and insurance groups,” and conservative policy-makers).
114. Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Rulings from
Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1189, 1194 & n.10 (2004)
(“It is no secret that Huber's book was aimed at the supposed abuse of science by civil
plaintiffs. Huber did not symmetrically apply the same standards to evidence offered by the
government in criminal cases.”). Importantly, “[t]his period also marked the beginning of an
era of the federalization of criminal law, when the federal government began to prosecute
crimes that had once been solely the responsibility of the states.” Bernstein, supra note 64,
at 390; see, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American
Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1148 (1995) (“The federal government's ‘war on
drugs’ is the single most significant contributor to this self-perpetuating cycle. The drug war
has skewed the federal criminal (and civil) justice system at every possible level.”).
115. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
116. Richard Marcus, Reexamining the Bendectin Litigation Story, 83 IOWA L. REV. 231,
236 (1997).
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defects in the children they carried.117 The first reported trial concerning
Bendectin was in 1980 and lasted two months.118 After multiple deadlocks,
the jury awarded a small “compromise” verdict of $20,000.119
Despite the limited success of the first trial, potential plaintiffs claimed
victory, and the number of those willing to join suit “increased
dramatically, resulting in the filing of numerous suits and the consolidation
of [smaller] cases into joint trials.”120 As it prepared to defend an escalating
number of cases, Merrell Dow removed Bendectin from the market in
1983.121 Contributing to the momentum for plaintiffs, the National
Enquirer ran a feature story that blamed Bendectin for babies born without
brains, some without eyeballs, and “several thousand tragically deformed
infants in the U.S. alone.”122 Quoted in the story was Dr. William McBride,
who had been widely credited as one of the physicians who first recognized
in the 1960s that a different drug, Thalidomide, had caused serious birth
defects.123
117. Susan Haack, Mind the Analytical Gap! Tracing a Fault Line in Daubert, 61 WAYNE
L. REV. 653, 659 (2016).
118. JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF MASS TORT LITIGATION 11
(1998).
119. In the first trial, Meckdeci v. Merrell National Laboratories, the jury returned a
small award to the parents for only the out-of-pocket costs for care of their injured son
(which had been stipulated to be $20,000). Id. at 12. The jury did not award any other
damages for the son’s injuries. Id.
120. Gary Edmond, Whigs in Court: Historical Problems with Expert Evidence, 14 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN 123, 160 (2002).
121. See W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REV.
547, 584 (2000) (“[T]he wave of Bendectin litigation ultimately cost manufacturers so much
that they stopped marketing the product.”).
122. HUBER, supra note 3, at 111. The headline read “New Thalidomide Scandal –
Experts Reveal.” SANDERS, supra note 118, at 10. See infra note 123 for background on the
history of Thalidomide.
123. SANDERS, supra note 118, at 5; see also McBride v. Merrell Dow & Pharm., Inc.,
800 F.2d 1208, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“The alleged link between Bendectin and birth
defects had begotten a widespread and heated public controversy over the drug's safety.
McBride voluntarily entered this controversy, intending to influence its outcome. As a
world-renowned expert on birth defects—he was prominent in discovering the dangers of
Thalidomide and has been dubbed the ‘Father of Teratology'— McBride occupied a central
place in the Bendectin debate.” (internal citations omitted)). Thalidomide was introduced as
a sedative in Europe in the late 1950s. Gail H. Javitt & Kathy Hudson, Regulating (for the
Benefit of) Future Persons: A Different Perspective on the FDA's Jurisdiction to Regulate
Human Reproductive Cloning, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1201, 1220. When given to women early
in pregnancy, however, it caused severe birth defects. Id. The FDA, having seen foreign
studies of the side effects, never approved Thalidomide for use in the United States. See
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Plaintiffs had other incentives to sue Merrell Dow. After Bendectin had
been on the market for two decades, “a few epidemiological studies
produced in the late 1970s raised, somewhat inconclusively, concerns about
its safety.”124 Merrell Dow had also been an early manufacturer and
distributor of Thalidomide in the 1960s, using questionably lax standards in
sharing the medication with numerous pregnant mothers despite the FDA’s
lack of approval.125 Around that same time, Merrell Dow had conducted
shoddy research concerning Bendectin, leading plaintiffs to conclude that
the company might have something to hide.126
Within a few short years, however, suits about the potential harms of
Bendectin began to seem much less meritorious. After the initial lawsuits,
the FDA and other researchers immediately began studying the drug,
providing a particularly well-developed suite of studies.127 Two years after
Marc A. Rodwin, Patient Accountability and Quality of Care: Lessons from Medical
Consumerism and the Patients' Rights, Women's Health and Disability Rights Movements,
20 AM. J. L. & MED. 147, 158 (1994).
124. Edmond, supra note 120, at 159; see also Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and
Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and
Bendectin Litigation, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 643, 679 (1992) (noting that plaintiffs were
encouraged by “the publicity generated about the allegations of Bendectin's teratogenicity
[and] the horror of the Thalidomide experience of the 1960s looming in the background”).
125. While awaiting FDA approval, Merrell Dow “engaged in what might charitably be
called extremely lax behavior” in distributing 2.5 million Thalidomide pills to 20,000
patients, including 624 pregnant women, injuring at least ten babies with significant birth
defects. Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass
Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 314 (1992). Interestingly, “[i]n recent years Thalidomide has
made a comeback of sorts as evidence increases that it may be effective in treating a variety
of serious diseases such as AIDS, cancer, and leprosy.” Javitt & Hudson, supra note 123, at
1221 n.146.
126. See Green, supra note 126, at 677 n.155 (“The first epidemiologic study performed
in 1963 by a Merrell employee and relied on by Merrell for fifteen years was so shoddy in
method and interpretation that even Merrell has conceded its lack of validity; it has provided
an inviting target for plaintiffs' attorneys' attacks and claims for punitive damages.”). In
addition, Merrell Dow employees were caught reclassifying various animal studies. Id. As
Professor Green concludes, “[G]iven the early scientific record, it was largely fortuitous that
Bendectin turned out not to [cause birth defects].” Id. at 678 n.155.
127. See Green, supra note 126, at 677 (“[T]he scientific record on Bendectin's
teratogenicity by the mid-to-late 1980s had become unusually rich.”). Indeed, “Bendectin
might safely be generalized to the relatively few agents for which an established and mature
body of epidemiologic evidence exists. Tobacco and asbestos are other such agents that
come to mind, albeit ones where the epidemiologic record demonstrates causation.” Id. at
679 n.116; see also id. at 679-80 (“In 1980, after the compromise jury verdict[], the FDA
convened a review panel of experts to examine the scientific record and render a judgment
on Bendectin's safety. The panel essentially exonerated Bendectin. The panel concluded
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being removed from the market, there were over thirty studies on the effects
of Bendectin.128 Because birth defects appear so soon after exposure, “the
development of a significant epidemiologic record [was] much more
feasible [for Bendectin] than for other toxic substances.”129
Looking back, the claims against Bendectin seem particularly futile.
Indeed, judges and scholars routinely cite the Bendectin litigation to
support the need for reform.130 Some have gone so far as to hold out the
Bendectin litigation as the epitome of plaintiffs using bad science to attack
perfectly safe products.131 Moreover, by the late 1980s it was becoming
increasingly obvious that Dr. McBride, who by then had served as a
plaintiffs' expert in multiple cases, had deliberately falsified his research on
Bendectin.132 Ultimately, Merrell Dow was vindicated, as not a single

that ‘available data do not demonstrate an association between birth defects and Bendectin.’”
(quoting Press Release, Department of Health and Human Services News, No. P80-45 (Oct.
7, 1980))).
128. Id. at 678 (“By 1985, there were twenty-one epidemiologic studies that focused on
Bendectin and fourteen other studies that included Bendectin (or one of its components)
among the agents studied.”).
129. Id. at 679. Bendectin’s toxicity was more investigated than many other suspected
toxic substances. Id. at 678. This is because the sort of injury alleged was apparent at birth,
which means it was detectable in less than nine months. Id. By contrast, many carcinogens
take decades to show their impact, “which greatly delay (and make more expensive)
epidemiologic study of carcinogens.” Id. This made Bendectin unique among the group of
suspected substances. The situation concerning Bendectin was also unique given its proven
record of safety because of the FDA and other investigations. See id. at 679 (“The additional
confidence provided the courts by the Food and Drug Administration's regulatory authority
over Bendectin is yet another reason why the Bendectin decisions are not generalizable.”).
130. See Edmond, supra note 120, at 160 (“The cases provide an extensive public record
of trial and appellate judgments and have generated considerable legal commentary.”).
131. See MICHAEL GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS
TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 328 (1996) (“Bendectin is the Taj Mahal of horror stories
about the tort system: the single most criticized piece of large-scale litigation of all time.”);
see also Edmond, supra note 120, at 160 (“[T]he concerns of commentators are focused on
the inability of juries, and to a lesser degree judges, to properly value the great weight of
scientific evidence that demonstrated no legally or scientifically meaningful correlation
between the incidence of birth defects and the consumption of Bendectin.”).
132. James M. Sabovich, Petition Without Prejudice: Against the Fraud Exception to
Noerr-Pennington Immunity from the Toxic Tort Perspective, 17 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1,
30-31 (2008) (citing Norman Swan, The Man Who Stopped Thalidomide Accused of Fraud,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Dec. 14, 1987)). Indeed, Dr. McBride was discharged from the
practice of medicine for having falsified Bendectin research the same year as Daubert. Id. at
31 n.200 (citing Margaret Scheikowski, Thalidomide Doctor Back After Fraud, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (Sydney, Austl.) Nov. 10, 1998, at 3).
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Bendectin verdict withstood appeal,133 but not before “the withdrawal of [a
major drug] from the market” and significant public health ramifications.134
Without the morning-sickness medication, many pregnant women
developed serious medical conditions requiring hospitalizations.135
C. Daubert to the Rescue?
By the time the Supreme Court was ready to hear Daubert,136 lower
“courts ha[d] taken a variety of inconsistent approaches in assessing the
admissibility of expert testimony on the causal link” between Bendectin and
plaintiffs' birth defects.137 The particular case in Daubert was very much
like all of the other Bendectin cases.138 In Daubert, “two boys [had been]
born with tragic birth defects that reduced the size of their limbs.”139 Their
parents sued Merrell Dow, as the manufacturer of “Bendectin, alleging that
the mothers' use of the drug during pregnancy caused the deformities.”140
At trial, the defendant’s experts had a stack of epidemiological studies all
concluding that Bendectin was perfectly safe.141 The plaintiffs’ experts had
mere “reanalyses of the data used in one or two of those epidemiological

133. Viscusi, supra note 123, at 584.
134. GREEN, supra note 133, at 336.
135. The absence of Bendectin led to “an increase in hospitalizations for hyperemesis
gravidarum, a severe form of morning sickness that requires medical intervention, often by
intravenous rehydration.” Id. Many American women drove to Canada to obtain Bendectin
and “[i]n desperation, a few doctors say they t[old] women essentially to make their own
Bendectin.” Sabovich, supra note 134, at 32 (quoting Gina Kolata, Controversial Drug
Makes a Comeback, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2000, at F.).
136. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd, 951
F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and aff'd, 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir.
1995).
137. Lewin, supra note 95, at 184–85; see also id. at 185 n.7 (collecting cases).
138. See Haack, supra note 117, at 659 (“Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals was
in most respects a routine Bendectin case, indistinguishable from the many other cases
alleging that this morning-sickness drug caused birth defects in the children born to women
who took it.”).
139. Bernstein, supra note 64, at 392; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 583.
140. Bernstein, supra note 64, at 392; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 583.
141. See Bernstein, supra note 64, at 392 (“The problem facing the plaintiffs was that the
defendant presented the trial court with a large body of epidemiological studies showing that
babies exposed to Bendectin in utero do not have a higher rate of limb reductions than those
not exposed.”).
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studies.”142 The trial court held that plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient to
show causation and granted summary judgment.143
The Ninth Circuit affirmed,144 and remarkably, relied on Frye in
upholding the lower court’s dismissal.145 The court noted that the plaintiffs'
experts had not submitted their reanalysis to peer review or published them
in a scientific journal.146 Citing Huber, the court held that because the work
was not “subjected to verification and scrutiny by others in the field,” it
would not be accepted in the scientific community.147 As many
commentators have reported, “[t]he Ninth Circuit's Daubert opinion quickly
gained notoriety for its strong reliance on Frye to exclude evidence in a
toxic tort case.”148 The Ninth Circuit’s unusual ruling, in combination with
a range of other rationales other circuits employed in the Bendectin

142. Id.
143. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 575-76 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ experts’ use of animal studies. See id. at 575
(“[E]xpert testimony concluding that Bendectin causes limb reduction defects which is
generally based upon in vitro studies, chemical structure analyses and animal studies is
insufficient to take the issue to the jury.”).
144. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129 (9th Cir. 1991).
145. See id. at 1129–30; see also Bernstein, supra note 65, at 392 (“[T]he court simply
ignored the fact that [Frye’s] general acceptance test had never previously been applied in a
civil case in the Ninth Circuit, and had only been applied twice before in the toxic tort
context in other jurisdictions.”); Haack, supra note 117, at 660 & n.50 (“[I]n affirming this
exclusion, the court of appeals had specifically cited Frye—which, however, had up till then
been used in criminal trials rather than in [two] civil cases.” (citing Barrel of Fun v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 739 F.2d at 1028 (5th Cir.1984); Christopherson v. Allied Signal
Corp., 902 F.2d 362 (5th Cir.1990), superseded by 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1990))).
146. Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1130.
147. Id. at 1131. As the Ninth Circuit reasoned on remand:
Bendectin litigation has been pending in the courts for over a decade, yet the
only review the plaintiffs' experts' work has received has been by judges and
juries, and the only place their theories and studies have been published is in
the pages of federal and state reporters. None of the plaintiffs' experts has
published his work on Bendectin in a scientific journal or solicited formal
review by his colleagues. Despite the many years the controversy has been
brewing, no one in the scientific community—except defendant's experts—has
deemed these studies worthy of verification, refutation or even comment. It's
as if there were a tacit understanding within the scientific community that
what's going on here is not science at all, but litigation.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir. 1995).
148. Bernstein, supra note 64, at 393.
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litigation, offered the Supreme Court the perfect case to square the standard
once and for all.149
While the Court certainly addressed the basic issue before it—namely,
the continued viability of Frye in the federal courts150—the Court went
further to establish a new standard for the admissibility of expert
evidence.151 In explaining this evidentiary standard, the Daubert Court
pointed to several factors that a trial judge might consider: (1) “whether a
theory or technique . . . can be (and has been) tested”; (2) “whether the
theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication”; (3)
“[i]n the case of a particular scientific technique . . . the known or potential
rate of error”; and (4) a scientific technique’s “degree of acceptance within
[a relevant scientific] community.”152 The Court emphasized that the
review is “a flexible one.”153 The Court expressed confidence in the
adversarial system, explaining that “[v]igorous cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of
proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but
admissible evidence.”154 As a procedural matter, the Court advised that
judges should perform a “preliminary assessment of whether that reasoning
or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid” in advance
of trial.155
Many have criticized the Daubert decision as unclear and contradictory,
leaving future courts confused as to whether they should interpret Daubert
as establishing a strict or lenient standard of admissibility.156 As Professor
David Bernstein and co-author Eric Lasker explain, the Court clearly
149. As the Court explained, “We granted certiorari in light of sharp divisions among the
courts regarding the proper standard for the admission of expert testimony.” Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993) (citation omitted).
150. Id. at 589 (holding that “the Frye test was displaced by the Rules of Evidence”).
151. See Flores et al., supra note 72, at 535 (detailing how “the ‘Daubert trilogy’ would
fundamentally alter the dynamic of expert evidence admissibility”).
152. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94. The Court further explained that “[m]any factors will
bear on the inquiry, and we do not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test.” Id. at
593.
153. Id. at 594.
154. Id. at 596 (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987)).
155. Id. at 592-93; see also Flores et al., supra note 72, at 536 (“Daubert effectively
placed judges in a ‘gatekeeper’ position, necessitating a more active role than under Frye
and charging them with the responsibility for evaluating the scientific validity of the basis
for expert testimony.”).
156. See, e.g., Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 89, at 5 (“The Court larded Daubert with
conflicting rhetoric that left ambiguous whether the case should be interpreted as
establishing a strict or lenient standard of admissibility.”).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss3/3

2019]

THE CRISIS OF “JUNK SCIENCE” IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 787

suggested a lenient standard when it “noted ‘the “liberal thrust” of the
Federal Rules [of Evidence] and their “general approach of relaxing the
traditional barriers to ‘opinion’ testimony,’”157 and “emphasized the
‘flexible’ nature of the inquiry in which trial courts must engage.”158 As
they point out, “[t]he Court [even] expressed optimism about the
capabilities of the adversarial process and of the jury, and [it] spoke of
‘shaky but admissible evidence.’”159 But the Court in Daubert also
suggests applying a strict standard. As Bernstein and Lasker explain, “the
Court insisted that trial court judges adopt ‘a gatekeeping role’ to ‘ensure
that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only
relevant, but reliable;’”160 “[t]he Court emphasized that Rule 702 ‘requires a
valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to
admissibility;’”161 “[a]nd the Court explained that under the Federal Rules,
a trial judge ‘exercises more control over experts than over lay
witnesses.’”162
The two most immediate changes to the courts from the Daubert
decision started with “the new role it thrust upon the district judge.”163
First, the examination of expert testimony shifted from after the verdict to
pretrial motions in limine.164 Interestingly, studies showed that the increase

157. Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588).
158. Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594).
159. Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596); see also David E. Bernstein, The
Misbegotten Judicial Resistance to the Daubert Revolution, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 27, 43
(2013) [hereinafter Bernstein, Misbegotten] (“The Court's more forgiving remarks seemed
aimed primarily at a mythical version of Frye, understood as an ‘austere’ rule that made it
extremely difficult to present expert testimony.”). The Court’s view of the application of
Frye “is not, in fact, how Frye had traditionally been applied.” Bernstein & Lasker, supra
note 90, at 5 n.14. Courts were far more permissive in their application of Frye than what the
Court suggested. See Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 90, at 6.
160. Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 90, at 5 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587, 597); see
also Lander, supra note 19, at 1662 (“The U.S. Supreme Court held that Rule 702 requires
courts to serve as ‘gatekeepers’ who must assess the underlying ‘reliability’ of proffered
expert testimony.”). “[T]here was nothing particularly novel about a trial judge having the
power to exclude inappropriate expert testimony,” given Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a).
Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse Interests: The Impact of the
Supreme Court's Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 289, 293 (2001) (citing FED. R. EVID. 104(a)). But “Daubert stressed the trial court's
obligation to exercise this power.” Id.
161. Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 90, at 5 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592).
162. Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595).
163. See Berger, supra note 160, at 293.
164. As Professor Berger points out,
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in motions was largely driven by civil defendants challenging plaintiffs’
experts.165
Second, “judges were put on notice that—like it or not—they were going
to have to deal with science.”166 Judges could no longer simply rely on the
credentials of an expert witness.167 Daubert now required judges to assess
the validity of the expert’s testimony and “whether their testimony was
based on ‘scientific knowledge.’”168
III. Daubert’s Impact on the Law and the Courts
A. The Daubert Trilogy
The Court continued to refine the Daubert standard in two subsequent
decisions, which together with Daubert comprise the “Daubert Trilogy.”
General Electric Co. v. Joiner,169 the second case in the trilogy, put greater
control in the hands of the trial court. The Court in Joiner addressed “the
standard of appellate review for evidentiary rulings” under Daubert.170 The
district court had excluded Joiner's experts and granted summary

Although some expert proof was excluded before trial on admissibility grounds
prior to Daubert, the Bendectin litigation demonstrates that this was not the
customary procedure in the federal courts. Plaintiffs were uniformly
unsuccessful in these cases in federal court, not because judges refused to admit
their proffered expert proof, but because trial and appellate courts found it
insufficient even when plaintiffs received a jury verdict at trial.
Id. at 293 n.29 (citing Sanders, supra note 125, at 374-79). “Defendants were quick to see
the implications.” Id. at 293. Judges’ new responsibility to filter out bad science before trial
“encouraged defendants to seek pretrial rulings on the admissibility of expert testimony and
to follow a favorable result with a motion for summary judgment if the experts excluded
were essential to the plaintiff's prima facie case.” Id.
165. See Flores et al., supra note 72, at 539; see also id. at 561-64 (discussing the results
of their study and summarizing data from other studies).
166. Berger, supra note 160, at 293.
167. Id.
168. Id.; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir.
1995) (applying, on remand, the standard created by the Supreme Court with the statement,
“Mindful of our position in the hierarchy of the federal judiciary, we take a deep breath and
proceed with this heady task”).
169. 522 U.S. 136 (1997) (considering plaintiff’s claim that his lung cancer is from
exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”)).
170. Id. at 140; see id. at 138-39 (“We granted certiorari in this case to determine what
standard an appellate court should apply in reviewing a trial court's decision to admit or
exclude expert testimony under Daubert. We hold that abuse of discretion is the appropriate
standard.” (citations omitted)).
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judgement, dismissing his case.171 The court of appeals reversed, arguing
that because there is a preference for admissibility, appellate courts should
apply a “particularly stringent standard of review.”172
The Court disagreed and held that Daubert had not changed the standard
of review of evidentiary exclusions, which remained the same as in other
evidentiary rulings: abuse of discretion.173 Because the exclusion of
plaintiff's expert proof on causation led to a grant of summary judgment,
the standard presumably applies even when the ruling was “outcome
determinative.”174 The Court went on to clarify that the trial court had not
abused its discretion in excluding Joiner's experts.175
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,176 the final case in the trilogy, expanded
the reach of Daubert to non-scientist expert witnesses.177 Specifically, the
171. The trial court found persuasive the absence of studies demonstrating the promotion
of cancer in any species other than mice. Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1324
(N.D. Ga. 1994), rev'd, 78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
172. Joiner, 78 F.3d at 529.
173. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 142.
174. Id. at 141-43. By imposing an abuse of discretion standard, however, the Court
“effectively insulates the trial judge's decision from serious appellate review.” Gottesman,
supra note 70, at 760 n.33. This is potentially worrisome because “only one trial judge sits
on a case, in contrast to multiple jurors, and thus a greater risk exists that an aberrant notion
will go uncorrected and determine the outcome.” Id.
175. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146-47. The Court provided a detailed review of why the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding plaintiff’s expert:
The studies involved infant mice that had developed cancer after being exposed
to PCB's. The infant mice in the studies had had massive doses of PCB's
injected directly into their peritoneums or stomachs. Joiner was an adult
human being whose alleged exposure to PCB's was far less than the exposure in
the animal studies. The PCB's were injected into the mice in a highly
concentrated form. The fluid with which Joiner had come into contact generally
had a much smaller PCB concentration of between 0-to-500 parts per million.
The cancer that these mice developed was alveologenic adenomas; Joiner had
developed small-cell carcinomas. No study demonstrated that adult mice
developed cancer after being exposed to PCB's. One of the experts admitted
that no study had demonstrated that PCB's lead to cancer in any other species.
Id. at 144. Because the Court employed such a detailed review of the evidence in question,
its opinion “provides insights into applying the Daubert test in a toxic tort context.” Berger,
supra note 158, at 294.
176. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
177. Id. at 138 (“The Daubert ‘gatekeeping’ obligation applies not only to ‘scientific’
testimony, but to all expert testimony.”); see id. at 147 (“The initial question before us is
whether this basic gatekeeping obligation applies only to ‘scientific’ testimony or to all
expert testimony. We . . . believe that it applies to all expert testimony.”); see id. at 151
(“We do not believe that Rule 702 creates a schematism that segregates expertise by type
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Court held that the Daubert test applied to plaintiff’s engineering expert.178
Importantly, the Court held that the exclusion of plaintiff’s expert was
proper, using a “flexible” application of Daubert.179 The Court emphasized
repeatedly that the Daubert test was to be viewed as “flexible” and not a
rigid checklist of factors to apply in every case.180 Without explaining
exactly how a trial court would determine whether a particular Daubert
factor is pertinent, the Court stressed that a trial court has “considerable
leeway” in developing its procedure for determining whether a particular
expert's testimony is reliable. As the Court left it, a judge “should consider
the specific factors identified in Daubert where they are reasonable
measures of the reliability of expert testimony.”181
B. Daubert: The Results
After twenty-five years, there is still considerable dispute over whether
Daubert has resulted in greater exclusion of expert testimony.182 The first
while mapping certain kinds of questions to certain kinds of experts. Life and the legal cases
that it generates are too complex to warrant so definitive a match.”).
178. See Berger, supra note 158, at 295 n.43 (“The court below, as well as some other
circuits, had held that a less stringent test applies in the case of non-scientific expert
testimony.”). Indeed, that was the appellate court’s decision here. See Carmichael v.
Samyang Tire, 131 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1998), rev'd, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526
U.S. 137 (1999) (holding that non-scientific testimony was not held to the Daubert test).
The case originated from a rear tire blowout on a minivan occupied by eight members of the
Carmichael family. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 142. One member of the Carmichael family
died in the resulting accident, and the others were severely injured. Id. The engineering
expert intended to testify that the blowout was due to a manufacturing or design defect. Id.
179. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 139 (“[T]here is no indication in the record that other
experts in the industry use Carlson's particular approach or that tire experts normally make
the very fine distinctions necessary to support his conclusions, nor are there references to
articles or papers that validate his approach.”).
180. According to the Court, the Daubert factors do not constitute a “definitive checklist
or test.” Id. at 150. The Court clarified:
[W]e can neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases and for all time the
applicability of the factors mentioned in Daubert, nor can we now do so for
subsets of cases categorized by category of expert or by kind of evidence. Too
much depends upon the particular circumstances of the particular case at issue.
Id. This flexibility was dependent on the facts of each individual case. Id.
181. Id. at 152 (“[W]e conclude that the trial judge must have considerable leeway in
deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert
testimony is reliable.”).
182. See Brandon L. Garrett & M. Chris Fabricant, The Myth of the Reliability Test, 86
FORDHAM L. REV. 1559, 1568 (2018) (“Some scholars, focusing on both civil and criminal
cases, have observed that Daubert did not change the practice in federal or state courts,
while others have found a qualitative difference and a measurably stricter analysis in civil
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sign that this might be a complicated question is that both sides of the
debate—plaintiff’s and defense counsel—claimed victory after the
decision.183 Many researchers have concluded that Daubert resulted in a
significant increase in the exclusion of expert testimony, particularly in the
area of toxic torts, and the case has drawn criticism that the standard set the
bar too high.184 Other interpretations of the data suggest that the exclusion
of expert testimony did not increase significantly after Daubert.185 The
cases in state and federal courts.”). Indeed, five years ago Professors Jurs & Devito noted
that “[t]he question of whether Daubert . . . adopted a more lenient or more stringent
standard for testing the reliability of expert evidence has dogged academics, practitioners,
and researchers for twenty years.” Jurs & Devito, supra note 48, at 677; see also Erica
Beecher-Monas, Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific Evidence,
71 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 74-76 (1998) (observing that already in the early days after Daubert,
the issue of whether Daubert imposes a stricter standard for the admissibility of scientific
evidence is a recurring topic of debate). Of course, conducting valid studies with precise
measures of the impact of Daubert runs into many logistical barriers, including selection
bias given how few cases proceed to trial and the difficulty in identifying information in
cases that utilize expert evidence, but in which no challenge or Daubert issue is raised,
among other problems in researching the issue. Flores et al., supra note 72, at 541.
183. Faigman et al., supra note 26, at 1819.
184. See, e.g., Jurs & Devito, supra note 48, at 677 n.4 (“Our analysis of district court
opinions suggests that after Daubert, judges scrutinized reliability more carefully and
applied stricter standards in deciding whether to admit expert evidence.” (quoting LLOYD
DIXON & BRIAN GILL, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CHANGES IN THE STANDARD FOR
ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE THE DAUBERT DECISION xv
(2001))); Carol Krafka et al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns
Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 309, 330
(2002) (“The number of trials in which all of the proffered expert testimony was allowed has
been reduced relative to the pre-Daubert era. The difference in rates is modest but robust.”);
Joseph Sanders, Applying Daubert Inconsistently? Proof of Individual Causation in Toxic
Tort and Forensic Cases, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1367, 1374 (2010) (“In no area has the
Daubert revolution had a greater effect than in toxic torts. The number of cases in which
expert causation testimony has been excluded must by now run into the thousands. Many
commentators have reacted negatively to this trend, arguing that the bar has been set too
high.”).
185. See Billauer, Daubert Debunked, supra note 64, at 22 (“While more evidence was
evaluated for admissibility after Daubert, by 1997 roughly the same percentage of evidence
was deemed admissible.”); Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert
Matter? A Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 498 (2005)
(finding that the influence of Daubert on removal rates was “vanishingly small” in
magnitude and “statistically insignificant”); Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of
Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 339, 345-46 (2002) (study of 693 state and federal criminal
appeals cases between 1987 and 1998 found no statistically significant change in overall
admissibility rates).
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reality is that “[r]esearch since 1993, using a variety of methodologies, has
been largely inconsistent.”186
The picture gets a little clearer when looking at the years immediately
before and after Daubert. According to a recent analysis, in the three years
prior to Daubert, there was a relatively sharp increase in the admissibility
of scientific evidence, particularly in toxic tort cases.187 This was followed
by a significant decrease in the three years following the decision, as the
rate of exclusion increased after the Court’s decision in Daubert.188 As the
author of the analysis concluded, “This suggests that the decision in
Daubert was a response to concerns about the increase in ‘junk science’
being used as evidence in court proceedings, and that the decrease
following Daubert was simply righting the ship.”189
Whatever impact Daubert had on the actual exclusion rates by courts,
one influence is fairly well-documented: the impact on perceptions and

186. Jurs & DeVito, supra note 48, at 677; see also id. at 731 (“Some survey data
indicated that judges saw Daubert as a stricter standard, while some did not. Some case
review analysis found that Daubert was a stricter standard, while some did not.”). But see
id. at 679-81 (finding evidence, based on changes in removal rates in four million cases from
state to federal court depending on state court adoption of Daubert standards, that “civil
defendants believe the Daubert standard is more restrictive to expert testimony and act
accordingly”).
187. Billauer, Daubert Debunked, supra note 64, at 18.
188. Id. Interestingly, “[w]hile more evidence was evaluated for admissibility after
Daubert, by 1997 “roughly the same percentage of evidence was deemed admissible.” Id. at
22; see id. at 23 (“In effect, then, Daubert merely effectuated a short-term course correction
to address an anomalous situation—before matters returned to the old status quo.”); id. at 23
n.103 (“noting sharp rise in excluded evidence immediately after Daubert and returning to
base-line equilibrium after 1997, assuming the years 1980-89 reflect baseline”); see also
Krafka et al., supra note 184, at 322 (reporting that federal judges surveyed prior to Daubert
reported excluding or limiting challenged expert evidence in 25% of the cases and excluding
or limiting challenged expert evidence in 41% in a survey conducted approximately a half
decade following the decision).
189. Billauer, Daubert Debunked, supra note 64, at 23; Alexandra Kennedy-Breit,
Admissibility of Expert Evidence to Prove Causation in Toxic Torts, 53 TORT TRIAL & INS.
PRAC. L.J. 139, 146 (2017). Another interesting recent discovery is that the percentage of
experts that are plaintiff’s experts has dropped significantly since Daubert. Flores et al.,
supra note 72, at 549. Of course, other changes besides Daubert have no doubt had an
impact on expert testimony admissibility. Id. at 564 (noting that in a survey of judges, one
common response was that “Daubert . . . was one change (albeit a major one) among many
used by the federal court system to deal with heavy caseloads and the growing use of expert
evidence.”); id. (“Thus, concluding that Daubert led to all the changes delineated in our
report could arguably be a spurious claim.”).
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norms.190 Indeed, some have argued “that Daubert’s most important
contribution . . . has more to do with Daubert's educative function than with
its doctrinal text.”191 Daubert created a “cultural shift” that altered the
behavior of both judges and lawyers.192 As one study noted, “attorneys
reported more closely scrutinizing the credentials of their own experts and
filing more motions to exclude opposing expert evidence.”193 The shift
from post-trial to pre-trial evaluation of expert witness testimony by courts
resulted in greater use of motions in limine.194 Lawyers also reported being
more active “in the preparation of their experts’ testimony.”195 Daubert’s
190. See Jurs & DeVito, supra note 48, at 731 (“[B]ased on actual behavior in millions of
real cases, civil defendants believe the Daubert standard to be a stricter one. Not only does
the removal rate increase in the years after Daubert, as one would expect if the standard for
admissibility is tighter, but we can also show that if the state adopts Daubert, and in so doing
returns the state and federal court to the same admissibility standard, the removal rate then
drops in response. Both of these effects support the conclusion that defendants perceive
Daubert as an advantageous, stricter standard.”).
191. A. Leah Vickers, Daubert, Critique and Interpretation: What Empirical Studies Tell
Us About the Application of Daubert, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 109, 147 (2005); see also id. at 110
(“Daubert has had a profound effect on the admissibility of evidence but not via the means
that most critics would guess. In fact, Daubert's impacts appear to be the result not of the
doctrinal test set forth in the decision, but rather of a cultural phenomenon either sparked by
the decision, or to which the decision has contributed.”).
192. Id. at 147 (observing that the impact of Daubert appears to be a cultural shift toward
a better appreciation of scientific evidence); see also Billauer, Daubert Debunked, supra note
64, at 22-23 (“I (and others) argue that the spike in evidentiary rejection in the years
preceding 1997 occurred because Daubert sounded a clarion cry that evidence was being too
hastily and inappropriately admitted in the period immediately prior—rather than any
implementation of the Daubert tests.”); id. at 23 n.106 (“[A]fter a short period of judicial
crackdown (1993-1997) plaintiffs' attorneys stopped introducing patently improper
evidence—a practice that in the years leading up to Daubert, was judicially sanctioned,
causing more bad science to be proffered, and more to be admitted.”).
193. Krafka et al., supra note 184, at 330. The study hypothesized that the change was
“[p]erhaps in response to the increasingly active role of the judges in excluding or limiting
testimony.” Id.; see also Flores et al., supra note 72, at 563 (“Daubert has had a
considerable impact with regard to challenges to proffered expert evidence. In limine
challenges have grown in frequency, and the bases of these challenges are now based
heavily on substantive grounds, including the Daubert standards.”).
194. Krafka et al., supra note 184, at 330 (“Motions in limine are in much greater use
than they were prior to Daubert, so it is not surprising to find that judges are holding more
pretrial Daubert-like hearings than previously.”).
195. Id. The changes in behavior have affected both lawyers and judges. See id. (“The
results of these surveys suggest that recent Supreme Court decisions have influenced the
practices of federal judges and attorneys with respect to expert testimony in civil cases.
Clarification of admissibility standards appears to have encouraged both groups to take a
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major impact was not through imposing a more rigid legal test, “but rather
in its ability to create greater awareness of the problems of junk science.” 196
C. Problems with Judges and the Application of the Daubert Standard
In the wake of Daubert, courts applied inconsistent criteria to the
admissibility of expert witness testimony. Lower courts relied on “cherrypicked, permissive-sounding language from Daubert” to justify their
rulings, which sparked efforts to amend the Federal Rules of Evidence to
better reflect and clarify the rule on expert admissibility.197 Rule 702 was
amended in 2000 “for the express purpose of resolving conflicts in the
courts about the meaning of Daubert.”198 The new rule, however, did not
fix the problem.199 As a recent analysis found, “federal courts often ignore
the language of amended Rule 702 when determining whether to uphold a
district court decision excluding expert testimony. Other courts pay lip
service to the Rule by quoting its language but then proceed to ignore its
text for the remainder of the opinion.”200 The researchers conclude that “it
is now apparent that the 2000 amendments to Rule 702 have not succeeded
in entrenching these requirements.”201

more active role in scrutinizing proffered testimony. Judges have become more discerning
with respect to the evidence they permit experts to introduce at trial.”).
196. Cheng & Yoon, supra note 185, at 503; see Vickers, supra note 191, at 140 (“To the
extent the decision had a real effect on admissibility, it did so primarily by informing judges
that they should function as gatekeepers to ensure that bad science does not make its way
into the courtroom.”).
197. Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 90, at 6.
198. Id. at 6; see also id. at 7 n.31 (“This Rule, along with other Federal Rules of
Evidence, was restyled in 2011 ’to make [it] more easily understood and to make style and
terminology consistent throughout the rules.’” (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory
committee's note to 2011 amendment)).
199. Id. at 43 (“Notwithstanding the rulemaking efforts of the Judicial Conference, the
courts remain as divided over Daubert's meaning today as they were in the 1990s.”).
200. Id. at 19 (citing cases as examples).
201. Id. at 8 (“Although the language of the 2000 amendments appeared sufficient at the
time to rein in recalcitrant judges who had tried to evade the Daubert trilogy's exacting
admissibility standards, with the benefit of hindsight, it is now clear that the Judicial
Conference failed to account for the tenacity of those who prefer the pre-Daubert approach
to expert testimony.”); see also Krafka et al., supra note 184, at 330 (“The bases for limiting
or excluding testimony do not appear to have been greatly affected by Daubert, at least not
with respect to the cases we sampled. Judges who excluded testimony in the recent survey
did so most often because it was not relevant, the witness was not qualified, or the testimony
would not have assisted the trier of fact. These reasons are similar to reasons most
frequently cited by judges in 1991, and they do not reflect the factors cited in Daubert.”).
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Part of the reason for judges’ lack of consistency in applying Daubert
could be a widespread lack of scientific competency.202 As Professor Jules
Epstein explains, “[s]tudies have shown an appalling lack of understanding
of Daubert . . . terms,”203 and “[j]udges, when surveyed, have
acknowledged ‘that their [scientific] education had left them inadequately
prepared to serve as gatekeepers under Daubert.’”204 In a survey of 400
state court judges, for example, 96% “reported that they had not received
instruction about general scientific methods and principles.”205 Confirming
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s worries in his Daubert dissent that the Court's
decision might result in turning judges into “amateur scientists,”206 one
study found that a relatively small percentage of judges have any job
202. See Andrew Jurs, Judicial Analysis of Complex & Cutting-Edge Science in the
Daubert Era: Epidemiologic Risk Assessment as a Test Case for Reform Strategies, 42
CONN. L. REV. 49, 52, 71 (2009) (“[E]mpirical research demonstrates that the judiciary is
poorly prepared to handle the difficult scientific issues presented in courtrooms.”); see also
Valerie P. Hans, Judges, Juries, and Scientific Evidence, 16 J.L. & POL'Y 19, 30 (2007)
(“Some scholars have speculated that many judges have little attraction to or aptitude for
math and science.”). Of course, lawyers are not much better. See Jules Epstein, The
National Commission on Forensic Science: Impactful or Ineffectual, 48 SETON HALL L. REV.
743, 756 n.73 (2018) (“[L]awyers as a group evidence an appalling degree of scientific
illiteracy, which ill equips them to educate and guide the bench in its decisions on
admissibility of evidence proffered through expert witnesses.”).
203. Epstein, supra note 202, at 757. See generally Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the
Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging Scientific Evidence in a Post-Daubert
World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 444-45 (2001) (asking 400 state court judges to define
error rate and falsifiability and finding that only 4% and 6%, respectively, could give a
sound definition of these two key guidelines from Daubert).
204. Epstein, supra note 202, at 757 (quoting Edward J. Imwinkelried, Expert Testimony
Trends in State Practice and the Uniform Rules of Evidence, in OPINION AND EXPERT
TESTIMONY IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 417 (ALI-CLE Course of Study 2008)).
205. Gatowski et al., supra note 203, at 442.
206. See Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 600-01 (1993) (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I do not doubt that Rule 702 confides to the
judge some gatekeeping responsibility. . . . But I do not think it imposes on them either the
obligation or the authority to become amateur scientists.”). On remand, the Ninth Circuit
echoed similar concerns. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th
Cir. 1995) (“As we read the Supreme Court's teaching in Daubert, therefore, though we are
largely untrained in science and certainly no match for any of the witnesses whose testimony
we are reviewing, it is our responsibility to determine whether those experts' proposed
testimony amounts to ‘scientific knowledge,’ constitutes ‘good science,’ and was ‘derived
by the scientific method.’”). Justice Breyer made a similar observation in Joiner. See
General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 148 (1997) (Breyer, J. concurring) (“[J]udges are
not scientists and do not have the scientific training that can facilitate the making of such
decisions.”).
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experience with math or science.207 Given the complexity of cases
involving science, judges may also have an irresistible incentive to bypass
the time-consuming analysis required in cases with hard science expert
testimony.208
IV. Daubert’s Unfinished Work: Criminal Cases
and Junk Forensic Science
While the data on the exact impact of Daubert may still be unsettled, one
distressing conclusion is clear: there are profound disparities in how
Daubert has been applied, both between civil and criminal contexts, and
between parties in each context. Multiple studies examining the disparities
reach the same result.209 Daubert has had little or no influence on the
admissibility of science—good or bad—in criminal cases.210 Initial studies
“showed that the bulk of federal cases citing to Daubert were in civil, not
207. Hans, supra note 202, at 30 (stating that, of the sixty-five judges surveyed, only
“five [7.7%] reported having some job experience [with] math or science”).
208. See Billauer, Daubert Debunked, supra note 64, at 4 (“It is no surprise, then, some
studies indicate that gatekeepers have simply substituted their own methods for evaluating
evidence, rather than relying on standards set forth in Daubert, which to them are
incomprehensible.”); Gottesman, supra note 70, at 760 n.33 (“[T]rial judges have an
incentive, however much they try to prevent its subconscious effect on their decisions, to
clear their crowded dockets of cases that are likely to be time-consuming and, given the
technicality of the evidence, tedious. A virtually unreviewable opportunity to shed cases
that the judge thinks of doubtful merit must be a powerful temptation.”).
209. See infra notes 212-51 and accompanying text (collecting studies).
210. See Flores et al., supra note 72, at 538 n.37 (“This lack of significant difference with
respect to changes in admissibility rates in the realm of criminal cases represents something
of a departure from what was found in research utilizing civil case samples.”); Groscup et
al., supra note 185, at 364 (reviewing criminal appellate decisions and observing “the
Daubert decision did not impact on the admission rates of expert testimony at either the trial
or the appellate court levels”); Neufeld, supra note 12, at S107 (calling Daubert “almost
irrelevant” to criminal justice). Perhaps this should not be a surprise, since Daubert itself
did not mention criminal cases or forensic science. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 621 (“For
instance, the opinion itself, which talked breathlessly about the scientific ideal of
‘reliability’ . . . conspicuously omitted any reference to the forensic sciences that routinely
arose in criminal courts.”). And the Ninth Circuit decision, on remand, went so far as to
suggest that forensic science was not part of the Daubert mandate. Daubert, 43 F.3d at
1315, 1317 n.5. As Professor Murphy puts it, the court was “palpably bristling at the
‘daunting’ task of acting as an arbiter of scientific reliability, [and] took pains to exempt
‘[f]ingerprint analysis, voice recognition, DNA fingerprinting and a variety of other
scientific endeavors closely tied to law enforcement’ from Daubert's strictures, setting up a
de facto divide between civil and criminal Daubert.” Murphy, supra note 1, at 622 (quoting
Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1317 n.5).
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criminal, cases.”211 Moreover, civil plaintiffs are more likely to lose on
expert witness admissibility challenges than civil defendants, while
criminal prosecutors are likely to win expert witness admissibility
challenges far more frequently than criminal defendants, and more often
than civil parties on either side.212 As Professor Susan Rozelle summed up,
“The game of scientific evidence looks fixed.”213 From all reaches of the
legal community, “commentators, scholars, and courts themselves seem to
acknowledge that there exists a Daubert double standard.”214
A. Disparities in the Courts Part I: Between Criminal and Civil
While the application of Daubert arguably put a limit on the use of
questionable science in civil cases, the opposite is true on the criminal side.
A recent study “observed an entrenched judicial unwillingness to review
expert evidence at all in criminal cases, much less to assess reliability and
restrict expert testimony that is unreliable.”215 The impact on criminal
defendants has been extreme, even leading to wrongful convictions, which
“predictably result from this lax attitude toward judicial gatekeeping.”216
Hundreds of people have been exonerated in the past two decades; roughly
half of these cases involved faulty forensic science that was not excluded by
211. Garrett & Fabricant, supra note 182, at 1567-68. The data shows a “marked tilt
toward civil litigation in the use of that expert gatekeeping standard.” Id. at 1567.
212. Deirdre Dwyer, (Why) Are Civil and Criminal Expert Evidence Different?, 43
TULSA L. REV. 381, 383 (2007) (“[Although] [t]here are significant methodological
difficulties with inferring general trial conduct from reported decisions, and particularly
where those decisions are appellate[,] [t]he published reports do broadly support the
anecdotal evidence of the unequal application of Daubert.”). As Professor Murphy put it,
“Civil defendants win their Daubert reliability challenges to plaintiffs' proffers most of the
time, and . . . criminal defendants virtually always lose their reliability challenges to
government proffers.” Murphy, supra note 1, at 622-23 (quoting D. Michael Risinger,
Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?,
64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 99 (2000)); see also Vickers, supra note 191, at 136 (“[C]ivil
defendants prevail in their challenges to expert testimony most of the time, while criminal
defendants ‘virtually always lose their reliability challenges.’” (quoting Risinger, supra, at
99)).
213. Susan Rozelle, Daubert, Schmaubert: Criminal Defendants and the Short End of the
Science Stick, 43 TULSA L. REV. 597, 598 (2007).
214. Murphy, supra note 1, at 624.
215. Garrett & Fabricant, supra note 182, at 1581; see also Margaret A. Berger, What
Has a Decade of Daubert Wrought?, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S59, S64 (2005) (citing studies
that show that “judges are much more likely since Daubert to scrutinize expert testimony
before trial and then to limit or exclude expert testimony” in civil cases, although “courts are
not applying Daubert stringently in the criminal context”).
216. Garrett & Fabricant, supra note 182, at 1581.
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the courts.217 Unfortunately for these exonerees, and the many wrongfully
convicted who will never have the chance to clear their names,218 “the
heightened standards of dependability imposed on expertise proffered in
civil cases has continued to expand, but . . . expertise proffered by the
prosecution in criminal cases has been largely insulated from any change in
pre-Daubert standards or approach.”219
Indeed, a recent report commissioned by the federal government
confirmed the different standards in civil and criminal cases, remarking that
“courts have not . . . imposed standards ensuring the application of
scientifically valid reasoning and reliable methodology in criminal cases
involving Daubert questions.”220 Furthermore, the report concludes that
upon reviewing the reported decisions, “at least in criminal cases, forensic
science evidence is not routinely scrutinized pursuant to the standard of
reliability enunciated in Daubert.”221 In civil cases, on the other hand,
“courts seem quite up to the task of evaluating microbiology, teratology,
and toxicology evidence, discussing both science and statistics with plenty
of acumen.”222 The general conclusion is that “judges do not appear to be
as vigilant in criminal cases as they are in civil cases.”223

217. Lander, supra note 19, at 1662 (reporting that some of the exonerees were “inmates
on death row or who had spent decades in prison” and that some of the defective science that
courts admitted to convict them was “egregiously” faulty).
218. Sadly, the “true number of wrongful convictions must be considerably larger since
evidence that could prove innocence is only rarely available and preserved.” Id.
219. Risinger, supra note 212, at 149; see also Paul C. Giannelli, The Supreme Court's
“Criminal” Daubert Cases, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1071, 1073 n.12 (2003) (“This issue is
not new. The first Bush Administration, by executive order, imposed high standards for the
admissibility of expert testimony in civil cases, while federal prosecutors were permitted to
argue for lower standards in DNA cases.”); see also Murphy, supra note 1, at 621 (“The
conventional wisdom holds, and empirical studies support, that evidence proffered by
plaintiffs in civil cases receives harsh scrutiny for reliability, whereas evidence proffered by
prosecutors in criminal cases typically gets a free pass.”).
220. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 96 (2009) [hereinafter NAS REPORT].
221. Id. at 106.
222. Moriarty, supra note 18, at 315; see also Saks, supra note 31, at 144-45 (“In civil
cases and especially tort cases, judges can be seen to enforce Daubert aggressively and often
insightfully, showing considerable acumen about research methodology. In other categories
of cases, judges appear to be either incapable of applying Daubert to the expertise before
them, or unwilling to do so, and find ways to evade the burden or to hedge the result that
would have emerged if they had conscientiously undertaken the burden Daubert imposes on
judges. These latter categories certainly include criminal cases, especially where the
government proffers crime laboratory experts whose expertise purports to link evidence
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Courts have admitted this disparity, too.224 For example, one court, in
evaluating proffered forensic handwriting expertise, concluded, “Were the
court to apply Daubert to the proffered FDE [forensic document examiner]
testimony, it would have to be excluded. This conclusion derives from a
straightforward analysis of the suggested Daubert factors.”225 The court
felt that it “might well have concluded that forensic document examination
constitutes precisely the sort of junk science that Daubert addressed.”226
Nevertheless, the court admitted the expert testimony.227 In another
criminal case, the court held bite mark testimony admissible, while
remarking that such evidence is “often speculative” and leaving it at that.228
In a recent study comparing treatment of handwriting analysis in civil
and criminal cases, Professor Julie Seaman found that “the Daubert
standard indeed may be disparately applied to even very similar evidence
when offered in criminal versus civil cases.”229 According to the study, “In
from the crime scene to the defendant. In these categories of cases, the principles of
Daubert seem to vanish.”).
223. Saks, supra note 31, at 145; see also Vickers, supra note 191, at 109-10 (reporting
that in the civil context, “studies show that after Daubert, parties challenged the
admissibility of evidence more frequently, and judges scrutinized evidence more carefully,
excluding a greater proportion of it”).
224. Julie A. Seaman, A Tale of Two Dauberts, 47 GA. L. REV. 889, 892 n.12 (2013) (“In
the federal courts, where a uniform standard ostensibly applies, a more or less explicit
acknowledgement occasionally peeks through.” (citing United States v. Prime, 220 F. Supp.
2d 1203, 1210 (W.D. Wash. 2002), aff'd, 363 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that “the
court reasoned that certain time-tested forensic techniques used by law enforcement should
not be excluded simply because of a lack of scientific data, methods, or statistical
significance”)); see also Murphy, supra note 1, at 624 (“Indeed, some criminal courts
admitting forensic evidence despite defense challenges to reliability have expressly
conceded that the proposed conclusions lack any scientific basis in data, methods, or
statistical significance—and yet nonetheless embraced them citing nothing more than their
longstanding pedigree.”).
225. United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
226. Id. at 1028.
227. Id. at 1049.
228. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 263 (Tenn. 1994); see also Erica Beecher-Monas,
Reality Bites: The Illusion of Science in Bite–Mark Evidence, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1369,
1373 (2009) (examining the court decision in Cazes) (“This is a far cry from the exacting
standards that the civil courts demand of expert evidence.”).
229. Seaman, supra note 224, at 892. But see id. (cautioning that her study was “hardly a
scientific sample”). Professor Seaman also examined fire science testimony and found that
the rates were similar for both civil and criminal cases. Yet fire science testimony is often
offered by defendants in civil cases, who enjoy a much higher success rate in civil cases than
defendants in criminal cases do. Id. at 898; see Risinger, supra note 212, at 99
(summarizing that “when civil defendants' proffers are challenged by plaintiffs, those
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the handwriting cases, prosecution evidence was admitted in nearly 90% of
the criminal cases, whereas on the civil side it was admitted (or at least not
excluded) in fewer than 40% of cases.”230
The disparity between courts in civil and criminal dockets leaves many
wondering why. As the court in United States v. Hebshie remarked, “it
cannot be that science is different in criminal cases than in civil ones. Bad
science is bad science; unreliable methodologies are unreliable
methodologies, no matter the side of the docket.”231 The stakes are
certainly high enough in criminal settings. In a criminal case, “the outcome
of the decision to admit or exclude expert testimony could affect the
defendant's freedom, liberty, and life.”232 Some even suggest that “[a]s a
general proposition, judges disfavor civil plaintiffs and criminal defendants
and are more likely to rule against them than against their opposites even
when presenting equivalent evidence or arguments.”233 Immediately after
the Court handed down its decision, Congress attempted to formally exempt
criminal evidence from the heightened scrutiny of Daubert courts.234
defendants usually win, but when criminal defendants' proffers are challenged by the
prosecution, the criminal defendants usually lose”); see also Murphy, supra note 1, at 626
(reexamining the data and concluding that “they reaffirm and deepen the initial underlying
premise: it depends as much on the offering party as it does on the type of case”); id. at 627
(“When faced with evidence offered by prosecutors or civil defendants, courts tend to take a
generous approach, whereas even the same kind of evidence offered by civil plaintiffs is met
with great skepticism.”).
230. Seaman, supra note 224, at 908.
231. United States v. Hebshie, 754 F. Supp. 2d 89, 115 (D. Mass. 2010). “Paradoxically,
and perhaps shamefully, this standard has not been consistently imposed in criminal cases.”
Id. (quoting Giannelli, supra note 219, at 1111).
232. Groscup et al., supra note 185, at 342.
233. Michael J. Saks & David L. Faigman, Expert Evidence After Daubert, 1 ANN. REV.
L. & SOC. SCI. 105, 122 (2005); see also Murphy, supra note 1 at 622 (“Such findings have
political and not just legal significance because in both civil and criminal cases, the methods
and techniques most vulnerable to Daubert scrutiny, as judged by scientific standards, tend
to be offered by only one side in the litigation.”); D. Michael Risinger, Goodbye to All That,
or a Fool's Errand, by One of the Fools: How I Stopped Worrying About Court Responses to
Handwriting Identification (and “Forensic Science” in General) and Learned to Love
Misinterpretations of Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 43 TULSA L. REV. 447, 473 (2007)
(concluding after examining how courts have overwhelmingly rejected defense challenges to
fingerprint evidence, “there is some reason to believe that judges as a group are resistant to
rejecting prosecution proffers of expert testimony”).
234. Murphy, supra note 1, at 624 (“In the wake of Daubert, federal lawmakers
circulated a bill to exempt criminal evidence from the proposed codification of the Daubert
test, but their efforts failed.” (citing H.R. 988, 104th Cong. (1995))). Georgia, however, still
provides for absolute admission of expert testimony in criminal cases. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-
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Criminal and civil cases have obvious and important differences, which
may contribute to the disparity in treatment by the courts.235 One primary
difference is the resources available to criminal and civil defendants.236 As
Professor Paul Giannelli explains, “Instead of worrying about the ‘hired
gun’ phenomenon as in civil litigation, the criminal defense lawyer often
lacks money for any ‘gun.’”237 The science in criminal matters is usually
produced in government labs rather than academic or private scientific
research.238 As a result, “expert evidence in criminal litigation is almost
exclusively the preserve of the state.”239 Civil defendants enjoy stronger
discovery mechanisms, such as depositions and interrogatories.240 Perhaps
most compelling, “there are strong policy grounds not to exclude a long
adopted form of expert evidence, because to do so may not only adversely
affect current and all future criminal prosecutions (though not

7-707 (2016) (“In criminal proceedings, the opinions of experts on any question of science,
skill, trade, or like questions shall always be admissible; and such opinions may be given on
the facts as proved by other witnesses.”).
235. See Giannelli, supra note 219, at 1072 (“The notion that expert testimony in
criminal and civil cases should be treated differently does not seem, at least to me, to be a
remarkable proposition.”).
236. See Saks, supra note 31, at 145 n.60 (“The government has crime labs dedicated to
serving police and prosecution needs. The defense has no institutional resources and
typically no resources at all with which to hire ad hoc experts to scrutinize, re-analyze, or
help think about the government's expert's report and testimony.”).
237. Giannelli, supra note 219, at 1072 (citing Peter J. Neufeld & Neville Colman, When
Science Takes the Witness Stand, SCI. AM., May 1990, at 46, 50 (“In DNA cases in
Oklahoma and Alabama, . . . the defense did not retain any experts, because the presiding
judge had refused to authorize funds.”)).
238. See Dwyer, supra note 212, at 390-91 (“[M]uch of the expert evidence presented at
a criminal trial is the product of disciplines that have been developed for the criminal
process, while most expert evidence in civil trials is in use in society more widely, including
in the area of academic scientific research.”).
239. Id. at 391 (citing three reasons for this) (“First, almost all specialists in forensic
science are employed by the state; secondly, most defendants are unable to afford to instruct
their own experts, and public defense funds are limited in all jurisdictions; thirdly, the state
controls crime scenes and physical evidence, and in turn access to materials for scientific
testing.”).
240. See Giannelli, supra note 219, at 1073 (“What is remarkable about the civil-criminal
dichotomy is that civil litigants have far greater discovery rights than criminal practitioners
even though it is well accepted that pretrial disclosure is critical. Not only are discovery
depositions and interrogatories unavailable, but a defendant in a death penalty case involving
DNA can be precluded from seeing an expert's lab notes before trial.”).
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investigations), but may also open the floodgates to appeals in all cases in
which fingerprint identification evidence played a part.”241
B. Disparities in the Courts Part II: Between Parties (in Both Criminal and
Civil Courts)
In addition to applying different standards across dockets, courts apply
Daubert differently depending on which side the party is on.242 A major
study243 by Professor Michael Risinger found that courts excluded plaintiffs'
proffered evidence at significantly higher rates than courts excluded
defense evidence.244 Evaluating appellate opinions, the study found that
approximately 90% of the challenges to expert witness testimony were
raised by civil defendants against plaintiffs’ experts, and defendants’
challenges were successful approximately two-thirds of the time.245 On the
flip side, in the comparatively small number of cases in which plaintiffs
challenged defense experts, plaintiffs’ challenges were successful roughly
half the time.246 Other studies have replicated Professor Risinger's findings
through various means.247 For example, a recent study from George Mason
University confirmed a similar disparity.248
Professor Risinger also examined criminal courts. There, too, he found
disturbing patterns. He identified 120 criminal appeal cases in which
Daubert had been cited.249 Of these, sixty-seven were cases in which the
government challenged the exclusion of its experts.250 In those sixty-seven

241. Dwyer, supra note 212, at 392.
242. See, e.g., Vickers, supra note 191, at 136-37 (“[C]ivil defendants prevail in their
challenges to expert testimony most of the time, while criminal defendants ‘virtually always
lose their reliability challenges.’”).
243. Professor Murphy called the Risinger study “iconic.” Murphy, supra note 1, at 623.
244. See generally Risinger, supra note 212, at 99 (“This article shows that, as to proffers
of asserted expert testimony, civil defendants win their Daubert reliability challenges to
plaintiffs' proffers most of the time.”).
245. Id. at 108.
246. Id.
247. Murphy, supra note 1, at 623 (citing NAS REPORT, supra note 220, at 11; Paul C.
Giannelli, Daubert and Criminal Prosecutions, 26 CRIM. JUST. 61 (2011)).
248. JAMES COOPER, TIMING AND DISPOSITION OF DAUBERT MOTIONS IN FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURT: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION ii (Geo. Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, Searle
Civil Justice Inst. 2015) (reviewing ten years of data from ninety-one federal district courts
and concluding that “[d]efendants are more likely than plaintiffs to have at least a portion of
their Daubert motion granted”).
249. Risinger, supra note 212, at 105.
250. Id.
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cases, the prosecution prevailed in sixty-one of them.251 On the other hand,
of fifty-four challenges by criminal defendants that their expert was
improperly excluded, the defendant lost forty-four cases.252 Of the ten that
the criminal defendants won, only one case was actually remanded for
retrial.253 As one commentator summarized, “It would seem that the expert
evidence of civil plaintiffs, particularly in toxic tort cases, is subject to
greater scrutiny than that of civil defendants, while the expert evidence of
criminal prosecutors is subject to less scrutiny than that of criminal
defendants, or than that of civil parties.”254
C. Junk Forensic Science
Two landmark studies by the federal government have validated deeply
troubling issues with the use of forensic science in American courts. In
2009, the National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) issued a “scathing
indictment”255 of the status of forensic science256 and concluded that,
“[w]ith the exception of nuclear DNA analysis, . . . no forensic method has
been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high
degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a
specific individual or source.” 257 The report pulled no punches. According
to the report, “The law's greatest dilemma in its heavy reliance on forensic
evidence . . . concerns the question of whether—and to what extent—there
is science in any given ‘forensic science’ discipline.”258

251. Id.
252. Id. at 106.
253. Id. at 106-07.
254. See Dwyer, supra note 212, at 383 (“[Although] [t]here are significant
methodological difficulties with inferring general trial conduct from reported decisions, and
particularly where those decisions are appellate[,] [t]he published reports do broadly support
the anecdotal evidence of the unequal application of Daubert.”).
255. Moriarty, supra note 18, at 300.
256. NAS REPORT, supra note 220, at 7. The report was initiated in 2005, “when
Congress mandated that the National Research Council, the research arm of the U.S.
National Academy of Sciences, undertake the first serious governmental study of forensic
science.” Lander, supra note 19, at 1663.
257. NAS REPORT, supra note 220, at 7-8. The NAS Report noted that “[n]ew doubts
about the accuracy of some forensic science practices have intensified with the growing
numbers of exonerations resulting from DNA analysis (and the concomitant realization that
guilty parties sometimes walk free).” Id. at 37.
258. NAS REPORT, supra note 220, at 87; see also id. at 7-8 (“The simple reality is that
the interpretation of forensic evidence is not always based on scientific studies to determine
its validity.”).
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In 2016, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology
(“PCAST”) issued a similarly damning report on forensic “featurecomparison” methods.259 In its 150-page report, PCAST detailed how bite
mark comparison evidence, shoeprint evidence, and firearms evidence are
not foundationally valid.260 PCAST determined that “there are two
important gaps” in the state of forensic science: “(1) the need for clarity
about the scientific standards for the validity and reliability of forensic
methods[;] and (2) the need to evaluate specific forensic methods to
determine whether they have been scientifically established as valid and
reliable.”261
In these two reports, the federal government acknowledged the crisis
exposed by the “large numbers of cases later shown by post-conviction
DNA tests to have been wrongful convictions of innocent defendants”
based on faulty science.262 Yet despite the government’s study and the
growing number of exonerated innocent defendants, “junk science”
nevertheless continues to be freely admitted into courtrooms by judges,
including some methods of identification so unreliable that they are not
“foundationally valid.”263 And courts compound and continue the problem
by relying on past cases without questioning even the most archaic
justifications.264
259. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF
FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 1 (2016) [hereinafter PCAST]. According to former cochair of PCAST, Professor Eric Lander, “PCAST is the leading scientific and technological
advisory body to the executive branch, originally chartered by President Eisenhower in the
weeks after the launch of Sputnik.” Lander, supra note 19, at 1664. “Feature-comparison”
methods are “methods that attempt to determine whether an evidentiary sample . . . is or is
not associated with a potential ‘source’ sample . . . based on the presence of similar patterns,
impressions, or other features in [each] sample.” PCAST, supra, at 1.
260. PCAST, supra note 259, at 7-14.
261. Id. at 1.
262. Garrett & Fabricant, supra note 182, at 1561; Lander, supra note 19, at 1662-63
(“Roughly half of these cases involved forensic-science evidence that was faulty—
sometimes egregiously so. The problem could not simply be blamed on a few ‘bad apples’
among forensic examiners. Rather, the failure was systemic in that some of the supposedly
scientific methods had never been shown to be scientifically valid.”).
263. PCAST, supra note 259, at 7-14.
264. Cole, supra note 114, at 1195-97. The inappropriateness of relying on past
assessments of science was keenly pointed out by Professor Moriarty in what she described
as the general “fallacy of historical reliance.” See Moriarty, supra note 18, at 316 (“As late
as 1920, the use of lancets and leeches for bloodletting was favored by some physicians to
treat pneumonia.”).
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One primary source of the problem is that much of forensic testimony is
generated in crime labs, which have come under fire for both institutional
issues and recent scandals. Crime labs are connected to (and therefore
closely aligned with) police departments, a link that undoubtedly creates
strong incentives to provide prosecutors and police with what they want,
rather than generate valid results.265 As a result, forensic science testimony
in criminal courts is “subject to significant unconscious bias” by experts
“seeking to help their bosses, the prosecutors.”266 Moreover, crime labs are
often underfunded, leading to significant quality control problems.267 The
lack of adequate resources has meant that “there is no division of labor
between forensic analysis and interpretation.”268 Despite their pristine
image on TV, the reality is that many crime labs suffer from poor training
and a failure to follow protocols.269
265. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 36. Publicly funded crime labs have, typically, an
incentive to gain convictions independently of the guilt or innocence of the convicted
person. See Roger Koppl & Meghan Sacks, The Criminal Justice System Creates Incentives
for False Convictions, 32 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 126, 128, 135, 139, 147 (2013) (stating that in
several states, for example, state law establishes that public crime labs be funded in part per
conviction); Paul C. Giannelli, Regulating DNA Laboratories: The New Gold Standard?, 69
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 617, 619 (2014) (citing John I. Thornton, Criminalistics—Past,
Present, and Future, 11 LEX ET SCIENTIA 1, 27 (1975) (“Because crime laboratories
developed in police departments, they were imbued, unsurprisingly, with a law enforcement
culture.”)).
266. See Bernstein, supra note 1, at 36 (“Moreover, the structure of the forensic science
system means that such bias, or even outright fraud, is likely to go undiscovered.”); Craig M.
Cooley, Nurturing Forensic Science, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 441, 442 (2011)
(“[S]ignificant evidence has surfaced over the last decade indicating that public crime
laboratories . . . are inadequately funded, staffed, and regulated.”).
267. Crime labs generally lack the resources and the capability to conduct foundational
research. Giannelli, supra note 265, at 620 n.14. As Professor Giannelli summarizes:
First, the early crime labs, as is still true today, were operational, not research,
laboratories. Second, basic research can be both time-consuming and
expensive, and the underfunding of crime laboratories has been chronic. Third,
even if research was perceived to be desirable, these laboratories were illequipped to conduct it. Police officers, whose skills were developed through
on-the-job training, staffed these labs.
Id.
268. Roger Koppl, How to Improve Forensic Science, 20 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 255 (2005).
269. See, e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, CSI Is a Lie, ATLANTIC, (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.
theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/csi-is-a-lie/390897/ (detailing crime lab issues in
Massachusetts, St. Paul, Colorado, Detroit, Philadelphia, and North Carolina). See generally
Mark Hansen, Crime Labs Under the Microscope After a String of Shoddy, Suspect and
Fraudulent Results, ABA J. (Sept. 2013), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
crime_labs_under_the_microscope_after_a_string_of_shoddy_suspect_and_fraudu/; Jordan
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Two public scandals highlight the issue. The Houston, Texas crime lab
was first exposed as “the paradigmatic example of a failed forensic agency”
in 2002.270 That year, a state audit revealed a “dysfunctional organization
with serious contamination issues and an untrained staff using shoddy
science.”271 As Professor Giannelli explained:
As described by a subsequent investigation, the DNA Section
was in shambles—plagued by a leaky roof, operating for years
without a line supervisor, overseen by a technical leader who had
no personal experience performing DNA analysis and who was
lacking the qualifications required under the FBI standards,
staffed by underpaid and undertrained analysts, and generating
mistake-ridden and poorly documented casework.272
Several defendants were identified as wrongly convicted and have since
been exonerated after the report.273 According to Texas state senator
Michael Smith, Forget CSI: A Disaster Is Happening in America’s Crime Labs, BUS.
INSIDER, (Apr. 30, 2015, 1:00 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/forensic-csi-crimelabs-disaster-2014-4#ixzz3N4ORFkgq.
270. Giannelli, supra note 265, at 634.
271. Id. at 634 (quoting Quality Assurance Audit of Houston Police Department Crime
Lab—DNA/Serology Section (Dec. 12-13, 2002)); see also Nick Madigan, Houston's
Troubled DNA Crime Lab Faces Growing Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2003, at L20
(reporting that operations were suspended after the audit found numerous problems,
“including poor calibration and maintenance of equipment, improper record keeping and a
lack of safeguards against contamination. . . . Among other problems, a leak in the roof was
found to be a potential contaminant of samples on tables below.”).
272. Giannelli, supra note 265, at 634 (quoting MICHAEL R. BROMWICH, THIRD REPORT
OF THE INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATOR FOR THE HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT CRIME
LABORATORY AND PROPERTY ROOM 5 (2005)).
273. See Adam Liptak & Ralph Blumenthal, New Doubt Cast on Testing in Houston
Police Crime Lab, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/05/us/
new-doubt-cast-on-testing-in-houston-police-crime-lab.html (summarizing a report that the
Houston crime lab offered “‘false and scientifically unsound’ reports and testimony”). The
issues with the crime lab are still prevalent. See Brian Rogers et al., Crime-Scene Errors Put
65 Cases Under Review, Audit Finds, HOUS. CHRON. (Apr. 12, 2017),
https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/New-evidence-problems-raise-questionsin-65-11068118.php (describing “errors by a Houston crime-scene investigator [that] raised
questions about key evidence in cases that include [twenty-six] homicides, [five] officerinvolved shootings, and [six] child deaths since 2015”); Brian Rogers, Ex-Crime Lab Analyst
Told HPD Colleagues of Wrongdoing, HOUS. CHRON. (June 25, 2014),
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Former-HPD-crimelab-analyst-told-colleagues-of-5580097.php (reporting “systemic, long-running complaints”
regarding the Houston Crime Lab dating back to 2002 which resulted in retesting evidence
in 185 cases, including fifty-one murders).
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Rodney Ellis, “the validity of almost any case that has relied upon evidence
produced by the lab is questionable.”274
A recent scandal in St. Paul, Minnesota is another example. Two
independent reviews of the St. Paul Police crime lab found “major errors in
almost every area” of the crime lab's work, including the processing of
fingerprint and crime scene evidence.275 Employees claimed that some of
the lab equipment was so poorly ventilated, that it spewed illegal substances
into the air and contaminated subsequent tests.276 The St. Paul Police
Department and other elements in the city government had supposedly
known of the problems for years.277 An earlier report had made specific
recommendations, but the city and the police department did not follow
through on many of the major recommendations.278
D. Specific Examples
1. Hair Analysis
Of the forensic science errors associated with wrongful convictions,
microscopic hair comparison is near the top of the list.279 The FBI and DOJ
274. Rodney Ellis, Editorial, Want Tough on Crime? Start by Fixing Houston Police
Department Lab, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 5, 2004, at D1.
275. The inventory of dysfunction at the crime lab is distressing in its breadth:
The failures include sloppy documentation, dirty equipment, faulty techniques
and ignorance of basic scientific procedures, according to reports released
Thursday. Lab employees even used Wikipedia as a "technical reference" in at
least one drug case. Consultants found lab employees mistakenly classified at
least one-third of all fingerprints as unidentifiable and destroyed them. Case
files "were largely unintelligible," consultants found. The lab lacked any clean
area designated for the review and collection of DNA evidence. The lab stored
crime scene photos on a computer that anyone could access without a
password. Conditions at the lab violated federal safety and health requirements.
Madeleine Baran, Troubled St. Paul Crime Lab Problems Even Worse Than First Thought,
Probe
Reveals,
MINN.
PUB.
RADIO
NEWS
(Feb.
14,
2013),
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2013/02/14/news/saint-paul-crime-lab-major-errors-found.
276. Chao Xiong, Crime Lab Reviews Cost $140K, STAR TRIB., Sept. 7, 2012, at B1.
Concerns were raised about tests being made unreliable from technicians’ failures to change
their gloves in between tests, as well as the reuse of the same tools on multiple samples. Id.
277. David Hanners, St. Paul Crime Lab Woes First Recognized in 2006, PIONEER PRESS,
Sept. 1, 2012, at 1A. A prior report by one police official recommended new accreditation
and millions for new equipment and employee costs. Id.
278. Id. The report further provided that the paucity of monies available to the lab had
overburdened the staff and limited the laboratory's ability to “sustain [its] current rates of
evidence examination and testing.” Id.
279. See Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 15 (2009) (reviewing multiple cases and reporting
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recently announced that in cases where hair analysis testimony had been
offered, “at least 90 percent of trial transcripts” contained “erroneous
statements” concerning the forensic evidence.280 According to the report,
“Twenty-six of 28 FBI agent/analysts provided either testimony with
erroneous statements or submitted laboratory reports with erroneous
statements.”281 In the first stage of the analysis, the government had
already determined that “[d]efendants in at least 35 of [those] cases
received the death penalty” and that errors were present in nearly all of
those cases (94%).282 Tragically, “[n]ine of [the] defendants have already
been executed[,] and five died of other causes while on death row.”283 As
Peter Neufeld, Co-Director of the Innocence Project, summarized the
report, “FBI microscopic hair analysts committed widespread, systematic
error, grossly exaggerating the significance of their data under oath with the
consequence of unfairly bolstering the prosecutions' case.”284
As a result of its recent analysis, the FBI sent letters to the governor of
every state in the country urging states to re-evaluate cases where
microscopic hair comparison was used to conclude a match.285 But the FBI
has known for years that hair analysis is a faulty science in criminal courts.
A 2002 paper by FBI scientists revealed that, “in contrast to earlier work
claiming that hairs from different sources could be distinguished with an
error rate of only 1 in 40,000 comparisons, DNA analysis of casework
revealed that 11 percent of hairs (that is, 1 in 9) reported as microscopically
that hair analysis may provide reliable evidence on some characteristics of the individual
from which the specimen was taken, but it may not be able to reliably match the specimen
with a specific individual).
280. See Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, FBI Testimony on Microscopic
Hair Analysis Contained Errors in at Least 90 Percent of Cases in Ongoing Review (Apr. 20,
2015), https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-testimony-on-microscopic-hairanalysis-contained-errors-in-at-least-90-percent-of-cases-in-ongoing-review (finding that
“erroneous statements were made in . . . (96 percent) of the cases” so far reviewed).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. The problem is much broader than just the FBI. The report also acknowledged
that the same faulty hair analysis science has been spread throughout state and local
enforcement agencies. See id. (“Over the course of 25 years, the FBI conducted multiple
two-week training courses that reached several hundred state and local hair examiners
throughout the country and that incorporated some of the same scientifically flawed
language that the FBI’s examiners had used in some lab reports and often in trial
testimony.”).
285. Letter from James B. Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau Investigation, to State Governors
(Feb. 26, 2016) (on file with author).
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indistinguishable actually came from different sources.”286 In its review of
hair analysis support materials provided by the DOJ, PCAST found that the
“papers described in the DOJ supporting document do not provide a
scientific basis for concluding that microscopic hair examination is a valid
and reliable process.”287 To date, over seventy people have been
exonerated after hair analysis was used to convict.288 One particular case is
emblematic. Santae Tribble, convicted of murder after an FBI analyst
testified that hair from a stocking mask linked Tribble to the crime and
“matched in all microscopic characteristics,” spent twenty-eight years “in
prison before DNA testing revealed that none of the 13 hairs belonged to
Tribble and that one came from a dog.”289
2. Fingerprints
The idea that fingerprint “matches” were not as absolute as previously
understood came into full public view when American lawyer Brandon
Mayfield was falsely accused of the Madrid train bombings in 2004.290 An
FBI examiner concluded with “100 percent” certainty that a fingerprint at
the crime scene matched Mayfield.291 Although there was no record of
286. Lander, supra note 19, at 1672; see also PCAST, supra note 259, at 28 (explaining
that the 2002 FBI analysis demonstrated that “the power of microscopic hair comparison to
distinguish between samples from different sources was much lower than previously
assumed”). One other issue is lax judicial review. In one stunning example, the Kentucky
Supreme Court acknowledged that the record cited no studies, and therefore contained
nothing that could support findings that the microscopic hair analysis had been satisfactorily
tested, or that methodologically competent studies existed (whether published and peer
reviewed or otherwise), and therefore no data existed regarding error rates. Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 258, 261 (Ky. 1999). Nevertheless, the Kentucky Supreme
Court thought the evidence was admissible thanks to the general acceptance factor. Id. at
262.
287. PCAST, supra note 259, at 120.
288. Hair Analysis Archives, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/
cases-categories/hair-analysis/#hair-analysis,exonerated-by-dna (last visited Nov. 28, 2018).
For fourteen defendants who had either been executed or died of other causes while awaiting
execution, the study came too late. Id.
289. PCAST supra note 259, at 44; Spencer S. Hsu, Santae Tribble Cleared in 1978
Murder Based on DNA Hair Test, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2012, at A30 (reporting that Tribble
spent twenty-eight years in prison).
290. See Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert Challenges to Fingerprints, 42 CRIM. L. BULL. 624,
635 (2006) (“The terrorist train bombing in Madrid on March 11, 2004, which killed 191
and injured 2,000, exploded the myth of fingerprint infallibility more than any other
event.”).
291. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. OVERSIGHT & REVIEW DIV., A REVIEW OF THE FBI'S
HANDLING OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE 64 (2006) [hereinafter OIG MAYFIELD REPORT
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Mayfield having traveled to Spain, and he did not even have a valid
passport,292 the FBI detained Mayfield for fourteen days based on the
fingerprint match, until Spanish authorities identified a different suspect as
the source of the fingerprint.293 In its 2011 report, the Office of Inspector
General concluded that the examiners “made errors in their application of
the latent fingerprint methodology that reflected systemic problems with the
FBI Laboratory’s operations.”294 In a previous report, the Office of
Inspector General had also determined that the fact that Mayfield was a
Muslim and had previously represented a convicted terrorist “also likely
contributed to the examiners’ failure” to catch the error.295
While courts have been admitting fingerprint evidence for over a
hundred years,296 the NAS Report in 2009 criticized the process for

I]. The affidavit submitted for the material witness warrant stated that the FBI senior
fingerprint examiner had a 100% certainty that the fingerprint at the crime scene matched
Mayfield. Id. at 63-64. The assessment was verified by the supervisor, who had thirty years
of experience in the FBI fingerprint lab. Id. at 64.
292. See id. at 58 (“Records reveal no travel by Mayfield or his wife as both have expired
passports.”). Undeterred, the FBI adapted the working hypothesis that Mayfield conducted
the crime from the United States. See id. (“At this time, we are leaning toward the theory
that Mayfield touched the bag in the U.S.”).
293. Id. at 1.
294. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. OVERSIGHT & REVIEW DIV., A REVIEW OF THE FBI'S
PROGRESS IN RESPONDING TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL REPORT ON THE FINGERPRINT MISIDENTIFICATION IN THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE
2 (2011) [hereinafter OIG MAYFIELD REPORT II]. The OIG “made 18 recommendations to
improve the FBI Laboratory’s latent print operations and help prevent future
misidentifications” as a result of its findings. Id.
295. OIG MAYFIELD REPORT I, supra note 291, at 179. However, “[t]he OIG [also]
concluded that Mayfield's religion was not the sole or primary cause of the FBI's failure to
question the original misidentification and catch its error.” Id. at 12 (“The primary factors
were the similarity of the prints and the laboratory's overconfidence in the superiority of its
examiners.”).
296. See OIG MAYFIELD REPORT II, supra note 294, at 19-20 (reviewing the case law and
concluding that “courts have, almost without exception, upheld the admissibility of latent
fingerprint evidence in response to Daubert challenges”); Mara L. Merlino et al., Meeting
the Challenges of the Daubert Trilogy: Refining and Redefining the Reliability of Forensic
Evidence, 43 TULSA L. REV. 417, 432 (2007) (“The use of fingerprints and latent print
examination as proof of identity has been a mainstay of the criminal justice system and
forensic science since it was first used in the 1910 trial of Thomas Jennings for the murder
of Clarence Hiller.”); Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification:
Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 127, 128 (2008),
https://academic.oup.com/lpr/article/7/2/127/916583 (describing judicial opinions that laud
fingerprint evidence as having “survived an entire century of testing within the crucible of
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identifying suspects based entirely on their fingerprints because it lacked an
industry-wide match standard.297 Similarly, PCAST concluded that
“estimated false positive rates are much higher than the general public . . .
would likely believe based on longstanding claims about the accuracy of
fingerprint analysis.”298 Few courts have carefully examined the reliability
of latent fingerprint testimony, instead relying on past decisions as
justification to allow the less-than-completely-accurate science.299 Indeed,
while there have been dozens of challenges to the admissibility of
fingerprint evidence using Daubert, “not a single court has been able to cite
any systematic empirical evidence supporting critical propositions
underlying fingerprint identification claims.”300 It was not until the
mistaken identification of an American lawyer in the Madrid railway
bombing that the FBI began a thorough review of fingerprint evidence and
initiated changes in protocols.301

the courtroom”). “Every circuit that has [ruled on] the admissibility of latent fingerprint
evidence has held that it is reliable.” OIG MAYFIELD REPORT II, supra note 294, at 20 n.22.
297. NAS REPORT, supra note 220, at 140-41 (discussing the degree to which latent
fingerprint analysis relies on the subjective interpretation of individual examiners).
298. PCAST, supra note 259, at 95.
299. Garrett & Fabricant, supra note 182, at 1570 (reviewing cases from every circuit
and finding that courts “typically do not conduct any meaningful analysis of reliability of
fingerprint evidence”). Instead, they rely on precedent. Id. (citing as examples United
States v. Spotted Elk, 548 F.3d 641, 663 (8th Cir. 2008) (failing to discuss the requirements
of court oversight but noting that fingerprint evidence has been recognized by other courts as
“generally accepted” (quoting United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672, 682 (8th Cir. 2003)));
United States v. Abreu, 406 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005) (declaring that “[w]e agree
with the decisions of our sister circuits and hold that the fingerprint evidence admitted in this
case satisfied Daubert” but failing to discuss or analyze any of the requirements)).
300. Saks, supra note 31, at 150; see also Mnookin, supra note 296, at 131 (noting “the
near-universal judicial” acceptance of fingerprint analysis, and her own conclusion that most
fingerprint evidence should be excluded under Daubert).
301. Donna Lee Elm, Continued Challenges for Forensics, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2017, at
4, 6 (“After the Madrid railway bombing led to the erroneous fingerprint ‘match’ with
attorney Brandon Mayfield, the FBI initiated strict scientific studies to research
‘confirmation bias’ on fingerprint opinions, resulting in changes in protocols.”); see also
PCAST, supra note 259, at 90 (“[C]oncerns about the reliability of latent fingerprint analysis
increased substantially following a prominent misidentification of a latent fingerprint
recovered from the 2004 bombing of the Madrid commuter train system.”). PCAST did
report that there has been improvement in beginning “to move latent print analysis in the
direction of an objective framework.” Id. at 91. Nevertheless, PCAST concluded that
fingerprint analysis has “a considerable way to go” before achieving objectivity. Id. at 88.
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3. Bite Mark Analysis
As problematic as hair analysis and fingerprint identification are, bite
mark analysis is discredited like no other science.302 After reviewing
numerous studies, PCAST concluded that “bite mark analysis does not meet
the scientific standards for foundational validity and is far from meeting
such standards.”303 The council went even further to suggest that bite mark
methodology likely “may not be salvageable.”304 PCAST’s findings were
not new. In 2009, the NAS Report identified some of the basic problems
inherent in bite mark analysis, including the lack of any studies to establish
the uniqueness of bite marks and the tendency of bite marks on the skin to
be distorted or change over time.305
One of the biggest concerns with bite mark evidence is that it is not
reliable even to establish the marks “left on a victim's body as bite marks at
all.”306 In 2016, the Texas Forensic Science Commission conducted a sixmonth investigation and “unanimously recommended a moratorium on the
use of bite mark identifications in criminal trials, concluding that the
validity of the technique has not been scientifically established.”307 As with
other questionable forensic science though, courts avoid analysis and
merely rely on past precedent to admit bite mark evidence.308
302. M. Chris Fabricant & Tucker Carrington, The Shifted Paradigm: Forensic Science’s
Overdue Evolution from Magic to Law, 4 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 38 (2016) (“Perhaps no
discredited forensic assay has benefited more from criminal courts’ abdication of gatekeeper
responsibilities than bite mark analysis.”).
303. PCAST, supra note 259, at 87.
304. Id. at 14.
305. NAS REPORT, supra note 220, at 175-76.
306. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 228, at 1380 (“There is a great deal of controversy
about the ability of forensic odontologists to identify marks left on a victim's body as bite
marks at all.”); see also PCAST, supra note 259, at 3 (reviewing studies and finding “that
current procedures for comparing bite marks are unable to reliably exclude or include a
suspect as a potential biter”); id. at 87 (“[A]vailable scientific evidence strongly suggests
that examiners cannot consistently agree on whether an injury is a human bite mark and
cannot identify the source of bite mark with reasonable accuracy.”).
307. Id. at 29; see also Russell D. Covey, Suspect Evidence and Coalmine Canaries, 55
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 537, 570 (2018) (“The Texas Forensic Science Commission has
recommended a moratorium on the use of bite mark evidence pending further scientific
validation of the methodology.”).
308. See Beecher–Monas, supra note 228, at 1372 (“Courts frequently admit bite mark
testimony simply because other courts have done so.”) (citing two cases as examples,
Verdict v. State, 868 S.W.2d 443, 447 (Ark. 1993) (finding no error in admitting bite mark
testimony of Dr. West because “evidence on human bite marks is widely accepted by the
courts”); State v. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55, 114 (N.J. 1999) (finding bite mark testimony
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V. What Options Exist for the Big Changes Needed

In the twenty-five years since the Daubert decision, criminal defendants
have seen little, if any, benefit from the landmark decision. And there has
been insufficient progress toward limiting the unreliable scientific
testimony used to convict them.309 The same lax oversight that the Court
employed in Barefoot is still the dominant practice in criminal courtrooms
today.310 There will be no easy fixes. As the Committee co-chairs
acknowledged in the NAS Report, “The forensic science system,
encompassing both research and practice, has serious problems that can
only be addressed by a national commitment to overhaul the current
structure that supports the forensic science community in this country.”311
The Court’s decision in Barefoot, the case discussed in the introduction,
still stands as a cautionary tale. In the penultimate decision of whether to
impose death,312 the Court had no problem relying on expert testimony—by

in a capital case to be reliable because “thirty states considering such evidence have found it
admissible”)).
309. See, e.g., Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 279, at 14 (reviewing the cases of
exonerated defendants where forensic science was used) (“[I]nvalid forensic science
testimony was not just common but prevalent. This study found that 82 cases—60% of the
137 in the study set—involved invalid forensic science testimony.”). As the authors point
out, “Though the technology has changed over time, the sources of human error,
misinterpretation, and misconduct have not.” Id. at 97; see also Jessica Gabel & Karyn
Heavenrich, Reigning in the Wild West: The Necessary Outcomes and Inevitable Pitfalls of
Reforming Forensic Science, 24 ALB. L. J. SCI. & TECH 81, 102 (2014) (“The number of
individuals convicted based on false evidence is staggering.”). A Ninth Circuit judge noted
that “[m]any defendants have been convicted and spent countless years in prison based on
evidence by arson experts who were later shown to be little better than witch doctors.” Alex
Kozinski, Preface: Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, v (2015).
310. See NAS REPORT, supra note 220, at 11 (“[T]he vast majority of the reported
opinions in criminal cases indicate that trial judges rarely exclude or restrict expert
testimony offered by prosecutors; most reported opinions also indicate that appellate courts
routinely deny appeals contesting trial court decisions admitting forensic evidence against
criminal defendants.”).
311. Id. at xx.
312. The Court has long recognized the fundamental difference in character between
death and all other penalties. As the Court has explained, “In capital proceedings generally,
this Court has demanded that factfinding procedures aspire to a heightened standard of
reliability. This especial concern is a natural consequence of the knowledge that execution
is the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; that death is different.” Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
305 (1976)).
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a psychiatrist known as “Dr. Death”313—that it understood as being wrong
more often than it was right.314 Justice Blackmun, ten years before he
would author Daubert, implored the Court to apply basic common sense.315
But all is not lost. Science has played a major role in one of the most
positive developments in criminal law over the last few decades. DNA
evidence has forever changed expectations for increased scientific validity
and, more importantly, freed hundreds of wrongly convicted. The decades
of progress to bring DNA into the mainstream bring hope for future
reforms.316 Efforts similar to those undertaken to establish DNA evidence
could provide the structural reforms necessary now.317 As Professor Adam
Shniderman explained, “Certainly, if the criminal justice system can
survive the challenge and exclusion of what is likely to be the most
conclusive forensic feature comparison discipline, it can survive the
exclusion of less certain and reliable forensic science disciplines.”318
Many who have carefully followed the history of forensic science and
the courts suggest that modifications to the Rules of Evidence and
clarifications in the instructions to courts would help address the current
problem.319 As the general argument goes, courts need more guidance on
313. The psychiatrist in question, James Grigson, nicknamed “Dr. Death,” came to some
prominence in the documentary film, The Thin Blue Line, which tells the story surrounding
the capital trial of Randall Adams. RON ROSENBAUM, TRAVELS WITH DR. DEATH 219
(1991). Filmmaker Errol Morris originally planned to do the film on Dr. Grigson but
changed his mind after investigating Hall’s case. Id. Morris’ efforts not only identified the
actual murderer in the case, but also led to the eventual exoneration of Hall. Id. Grigson
was later reprimanded by the American Psychological Association for his opinion on
predictions of future dangerousness. Id. at 218.
314. The Court was sufficiently comfortable that “the jury will [] be able to separate the
wheat from the chaff.” Barefoot v. Estrelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 n.7 (1983). Writing for the
Court, Justice White noted that “[n]either petitioner nor [amicus American Psychological
Association] suggests that psychiatrists are always wrong with respect to future
dangerousness, only most of the time.” Id. at 901. At another point the Court wrote, “We
are not persuaded that such testimony is almost entirely unreliable . . . .” Id. at 899.
315. See id. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The Court holds that psychiatric
testimony about a defendant's future dangerousness is admissible, despite the fact that such
testimony is wrong two times out of three.”).
316. See Adam B. Shniderman, Prosecutors Respond to Calls for Forensic Science
Reform: More Sharks in Dirty Water, 126 YALE L.J. F. 348, 357-60 (2017) (detailing how
DNA evidence became a trusted mainstay in criminal courts).
317. See id. at 357 (“DNA profiling is an excellent starting point for discussing how best
to reform scientific evidence.”).
318. Id. at 360.
319. See, e.g., Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 89, at 44 (“[Y]ears of experience under
amended Rule 702 teaches that revisions to the Rule are needed. These revisions need not
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what the proper criteria are for assessing expert testimony in criminal
cases.320 As part of its recommendations for reform, PCAST stated that one
of the most effective solutions would be for the Judicial Conference of the
United States to clarify the meaning of “reliable methods” for forensic
feature-comparison methods.321
While such reforms would be welcome, it is hard to see how additional
changes to the rules would have any more impact than previous changes
did, particularly considering how poorly courts have interpreted the current
rules. The rules were changed in 2000 (and again stylistically updated in
2007) to address lower court confusion over how to apply Daubert. It is
clear that those reforms did not have the impact sought. What would make
this time different?
Media reports have had significant impact on forensic evidence,
particularly when measured against the scope of public awareness. The
very public—and highly publicized322—case of Brandon Mayfield clearly
involve wholesale changes.”); see also Karen Kafadar, The Critical Role of Statistics in
Demonstrating the Reliability of Expert Evidence, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1617, 1635 (2018)
(reporting that Brendan Max, chief of the forensic science division at the Chicago Public
Defender’s Office “recommends the following changes to Rule 702: (1) ‘Require pre-trial
qualification evidentiary hearings upon written motion of a litigant,’ (2) ‘[r]equire any expert
who is the subject of a pre-trial qualification hearing to submit to a compulsory deposition,
and’ (3) ‘[r]equire that experts disclose all the facts and data that support their proffered
opinions (such as all features in a fingerprint case that support an association between a
latent print and a suspect)’”); Garrett & Fabricant, supra note 182, at 1564 (“The language
of Rule 702 is not the sole problem—after all, that language squarely addresses reliability,
both of methods and their application to the facts. That reliability language, however, has
largely been ignored by state and federal judges. More forceful language might make the
importance of assessing reliability more salient to judges, perhaps with more detailed
accompanying guidance in Advisory Committee notes.”).
320. Bernstein & Lasker, supra note 89, at 43 (“The Supreme Court is ill-positioned to
solve this problem. The Court can decide only issues in the context of specific cases, and
even if a case cleanly presents one of the many conflicts that have arisen over Daubert, the
other conflicts would remain.”); see also Lander, supra note 19, at 1676 (“First, many judges
simply do not know how to apply the concepts of reliability and scientific validity to any
given scientific discipline. In the absence of a clear definition, they are often willing to
accept the trappings of reliability (examiners' experience and professional practices) rather
than insist on actual reliability. Second, many judges are also reluctant to challenge
longstanding precedents concerning the admissibility of forensic methods, even when they
were established long before current problems became apparent.”).
321. PCAST, supra note 259, at 20.
322. See, e.g., Sharon Begley, Fingerprint Matches Come Under More Fire as
Potentially Fallible, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2005, 12:01 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB112864132376462238; Sarah Kershaw & Eric Lichtblau, Bomb Case Against
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pushed the FBI to look more carefully at fingerprint evidence.323 The
agency’s open confession about past misdeeds is certainly a good start, but
significantly more progress is required. The media coverage of crime lab
abuses is another example of increasing public awareness, and in some
cases it is spearheading reform.324 Also, continued media exposure of the
problems with forensic science would keep up its role in making changes.
Further exonerations and the promotion of those stories, such as those of
Santae Tribble and even Dr. Death—the subject of the documentary that
saved the life of Randall Hall325—might encourage such changes.
Both the NAS Report and PCAST Study were heralded as important
developments in improving how forensic science would be used in criminal
courts.326 The NAS issued the report after Congress, in 2005, ordered it to
“assess the present and future resource needs of the forensic science
community,” recognizing that “there exists little to no analysis of the
remaining needs of the community outside of the area of DNA.”327 The
members of the NAS committee included research scientists, academics,
Lawyer Is Rejected, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/25/
us/bomb-case-against-lawyer-is-rejected.html.
323. See Epstein, supra note 202, at 747 (“The highly publicized error was a significant
event in the lead-up to the National Academy of Science review of the state of forensic
discipline practice and testimony.”).
324. See, e.g., Giannelli, supra note 20, at 187 (detailing the history of the problems in
the Houston crime lab) (“The story began with a television station's investigation, which led
in turn to a state audit of the lab in December 2002.”). Another example is the FBI’s
abandonment of tracing bullets to a specific manufacturer’s batch after 60 Minutes and the
Washington Post reported problems with reliability. See Spencer S. Hsu, Justice Dept., FBI
to Review Use of Forensic Evidence in Thousands of Cases, WASH. POST (July 10, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/justice-dept-fbi-to-review-use-of-forensicevidence-in-thousands-of-cases/2012/07/10/gJQAT6DlbW_story.html?
noredirect=on&utm_term=.4a3c6514428e; Steve Kroft, Evidence of Injustice: FBI's Bullet
Lead Analysis Used Flawed Science to Convict Hundreds of Defendants, 60 MINUTES (Nov.
16, 2007), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/evidence-of-injustice (noting that the CBLA
paradigm “went unchallenged for 40 years—until [William] Tobin [who was the chief
metallurgist for the FBI] retired in 1998 and decided to do his own study, discovering that
the basic premise had never actually been scientifically tested”).
325. See infra note 313 and accompanying text.
326. See Lander, supra note 19, at 1676 (sharing his assessment as co-chair of PCAST
from 2009-17) (“They have unanimously agreed that methods have historically lacked
meaningful scientific validation, that their accuracy has been seriously overstated, and that
their misuse has led to wrongful convictions. Moreover, they agree that requiring empirical
testing is feasible and would increase the quality of forensic science—with benefits for
prosecutors, defendants, and the public.”).
327. NAS REPORT, supra note 220, at 1-2.
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forensic scientists, pathologists, judges, a defense attorney, and a former
prosecutor.328 In 2015, President Obama requested that PCAST determine
“whether there were additional steps on the scientific side, beyond those
already taken by the Administration in the aftermath of the highly critical
[NAS] report.”329 In response, PCAST established a panel of senior
advisors that included ten current or former judges, a former U.S. Solicitor
General, two law-school deans, and two statisticians.330
Despite the work of both of these organizations, neither report made
much of a dent in criminal courtrooms. The NAS Report, which is now
nearly ten years old, is still relatively unknown in most mainstream legal
circles.331 The reality is that “the Report has had minimal impact on the
admissibility or scope of forensic discipline testimony or the conclusions an
expert is permitted to present.”332 While it was mentioned in a number of
court decisions, “[m]any of those involve passing references or discussions
of whether the Report, when relied upon in a post-conviction proceeding,
constitutes newly-discovered evidence.”333
In 2017, the National
Commission on Forensic Science, a product of the NAS Report, “was
forced to disband as a result of Attorney General Jeff Sessions' decision not
to renew the Commission's charter.”334
328. Id. at v, 287-302; see also Harry T. Edwards, The National Academy of Sciences
Report in Forensic Sciences: What It Means for the Bench and Bar, 51 JURIMETRICS J. 1
(2010) (“The Committee was composed of a diverse and accomplished group of
professionals. Seven of the 17 Committee members are prominent professionals in the
forensic science community, with extensive experience in forensic analysis and practice; 11
members of the committee are trained scientists (with expertise in physics, chemistry,
biology, engineering, biostatistics, statistics, and medicine); 10 members of the Committee
have Ph.D.’s., 2 have M.D.’s, 5 have J.D.’s, and one has an M.S. in chemistry.”).
329. PCAST, supra note 259, at x.
330. Id. at vii-ix; see also Lander, supra note 19, at 1664 (“The unanimous report was the
result of a year-long study, during which PCAST reviewed 2,100 scientific papers, as well as
hundreds of pages of input invited from the forensic-science community.”).
331. See Epstein, supra note 202, at 757 (“[J]udges and practitioners are often unaware
of the NAS Report . . . .”).
332. Id. at 755 (“Courts have either let the experts continue their testimony in the same
form as before the Report was issued or ‘toned it down’ in form but not in substance, as
when an expert would have to testify only that it was his or her ‘opinion’ that the fingerprint
came from the defendant and no other source or use the term ‘reasonable ballistic certainty’
rather than ‘reasonable scientific certainty.’”).
333. Id. at 755; see also Garrett & Fabricant, supra note 182, at 1580 (“Very few rulings
cited to the 2009 [NAS] Report.”).
334. Epstein, supra note 202, at 743.
The Commission originated with the
recommendations of the NAS Report. See NAS REPORT, supra note 220, at 18 (“The
committee believes that what is needed to support and oversee the forensic science
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Similarly, PCAST has already been rejected by prosecutors and courts.335
This is maybe no surprise given that President Obama’s own Attorney
General did not adopt the report.336 Prosecutors immediately rejected its
findings.337 Defense counsel relying on PCAST and its warnings about the
lack of scientific validity have already been left wanting in the courtroom,
as courts are rejecting objections to expert testimony based on PCAST’s
findings.338
community is a new, strong, and independent entity that could take on the tasks that would
be assigned to it in a manner that is as objective and free of bias as possible—one with no
ties to the past and with the authority and resources to implement a fresh agenda designed to
address the problems found by the committee and discussed in this report.”); see also
Epstein, supra note 202, at 747-48 (detailing the steps from the NAS Report
recommendation to the actual establishment of the NCFS). Unfortunately, however, “the
Commission's work and indeed its existence can be seen as having had no relevance to the
judiciary.” Id. at 754 (“As of June 4, 2017, only one reported decision even mentions the
Commission's existence, and even then, only noting that an expert witness mentioned the
Commission while describing his credentials, stating he was invited to serve on one of its
subcommittees.”).
335. See Garrett & Fabricant, supra note 182, at 1580 (“New research findings, reports
from scientific bodies, and changes in the law have had little impact on this analysis.”).
336. See Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler, Designed to Fail: The President's Deference
to the Department of Justice in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 59 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 387, 452-53 (2017) (“Despite the fact that the PCAST report was authored by nineteen
preeminent scientists, that its logic and grounding in scientific methods is irrefutable, that it
was commissioned by the President, and that its results were touted in a press release by the
White House, the Department [of Justice] simply refused to accept it.”). The DOJ response
was noteworthy for both its refusal and for its concision. “Attorney General Loretta Lynch
curtly and quickly responded to PCAST's release that, although the Department
‘appreciate[s] their contribution to the field of scientific inquiry, the [D]epartment will not
be adopting the recommendations related to the admissibility of forensic science evidence.’”
Id. at 453 (alteration in original) (quoting Gary Fields, White House Advisory Council
Report Is Critical of Forensics Used in Criminal Trials, WALL ST. J., (Sept. 20, 2016, 4:25
PM
ET),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-advisory-council-releases-reportcritical-of-forensics-used-in-criminal-trials-1474394743).
337. See infra note 340 and accompanying text; see also Radley Balko, Opinion,
Incredibly, Prosecutors Are Still Defending Bite Mark Analysis, WASH. POST (Jan. 30,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2017/01/30/incrediblyprosecutors-are-still-defending-bite-mark-evidence/?utm_term=.b8e2012c4c1b (detailing the
filings of prosecutors since PCAST and observing that they are “arguing that
the only opinions that should matter in these cases are those of prior courts, prosecutors, law
enforcement and the small community of forensic analysts in the very field being
challenged”).
338. See, e.g., State v. Patel, No. LLICR130143598S, 2016 WL 8135385, at *8 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Dec. 28, 2016) (rejecting an objection based on the PCAST report) (“The
defendant's reference to the PCAST report is insufficient to bring about a different result.
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That may leave it to the prosecutors, who have yet to embrace forensic
science reform at the group level. Indeed, the reaction to PCAST from the
National District Attorneys Association (NDAA) “leave[s] little hope” that
the necessary reforms will come from prosecutors.339 The NDAA released
a press statement shortly after PCAST’s report was published criticizing the
report and arguing that “the opinions expressed by PCAST in their report
clearly and obviously disregard large bodies of scientific evidence to the
contrary and rely, at times, on unreliable and discredited research.” 340
NDAA decried the report as “scientifically irresponsible” and cautioned
that adopting “any” of its recommendations would have a “devastating
effect” on law enforcement.341
But the real changes in Daubert in the civil side were as much about
culture and norms as they were about rules and law.342 Changes in attitude
and processes ushered in whatever “revolution” Daubert brought to toxic
tort litigation. Perhaps a similar miracle is possible in criminal courtrooms
and prosecutors?
This is not a new idea, of course.343 Prosecutors are in the best position
to make the necessary changes, since they are the ones who offer the
scientific evidence in question.344 Indeed, prosecutors have been on notice
There is no basis on which this court can conclude, as the defendant would have it, that the
PCAST report constitutes ‘the scientific community.’”).
339. See Shniderman, supra note 316, at 349 (“Initial reactions to the PCAST report from
the law enforcement community leave little hope that it will inspire any more reform than
the NAS Report has.”).
340. Press Release, Nat'l Dist. Attorneys Ass'n, National District Attorneys Association
Slams President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology Report (Sept. 2, 2016),
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20Press%C20Release%C20on%C20PCAST%20Report.p
df.
341. Id. Six weeks later, the NDAA submitted a letter to President Obama detailing its
concerns about the report. Letter from Michael A. Ramos, President, Nat'l Dist. Attorneys
Ass'n, to President Obama (Nov. 16, 2016), http://tinyurl.com/hczkt3k. The NDAA argued
that not all of the feature comparison disciplines will necessarily be subject to strict
admissibility requirements of “science,” because some disciplines incorporate certain aspects
of science but also constitute “technical” and “specialized knowledge” as described by
Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Id.
342. See supra notes 187-93 and accompanying text.
343. Ten years ago, it was reported that “the legal system and commentators have paid
little attention to prosecutorial discretion in the use of unreliable expert testimony—despite
mounting evidence that misconvictions have been based upon unreliable expert testimony.”
Jane Campbell Moriarty, “Misconvictions,” Science, and the Ministers of Justice, 86 NEB L.
REV. 1, 23 (2007).
344. See Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 279, at 85 (detailing concerns about how
prosecutors distort and exaggerate “the testimony of the forensic analyst in closings, making

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

820

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:759

long enough that some of the forensic science on which they rely is likely
unreliable.345 Their own ethical obligations should provide some limits.346
They could enact these changes earlier in the process, where the scientific
evidence is used to consider indictment and proceeding to trial.347
VI. Conclusion
The revolution that Daubert was to bring regarding how courts managed
science is still unfinished.348 Its impact on toxic tort cases arguably
provided a necessary framework to improve how lawyers use science
through expert witnesses. Its neglect in the criminal courts is a stain on our
system of justice. Unreliable forensic science plagues our criminal trials
and defendants are wrongly convicted as a result. After two major
government studies and several decades of calls for reform from
researchers, academics, and criminal lawyers, there is no longer any doubt
that a wide range of scientific methods for identifying defendants, in
claims that the forensic scientist clearly did not make”); Bennett L. Gershman, Misuse of
Scientific Evidence by Prosecutors, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 17, 18-19 (2003) (“Many, if
not most, . . . wrongful convictions are attributable to scientific evidence presented by
prosecutors as trustworthy, and relied on as such by juries, when in fact the evidence was
erroneous or fraudulent.”).
345. See Covey, supra note 307, at 538 (“Even prior to the recent revelations regarding
these forensic practices, it is virtually inconceivable that prosecutors were not aware of the
risks involved. Nonetheless, prosecutors have not only used such evidence to obtain scores
of criminal convictions, but they continue to do so.”).
346. See Bruce A. Green, Access to Criminal Justice: Where Are the Prosecutors, 3 TEX.
A&M L. REV. 515, 527-28 (2016) (“[T]o protect against wrongful convictions, good
prosecutors should not introduce unreliable evidence, even if, for disciplinary purposes, they
may do so. It is unfair for prosecutors to leave it to lay juries to determine the credibility of
dubious evidence. A prosecutor has a gate-keeping function to assure the credibility of
evidence: If prosecutors themselves do not reasonably believe testimony, they should not
present it to the jury. And particularly in the case of forensic evidence that a jury lacks the
scientific and technical capability to evaluate, prosecutors should ensure the reliability of the
testimony.”).
347. Moriarty, supra note 343, at 27 (“If it is too much to ask prosecutors to secondguess their scientific and expert evidence in the heat of trial or after a conviction, perhaps
prosecutors should think about their discretionary actions in the pre-indictment and pre-trial
stages of the case, where much of the forensic science is developed as the bedrock of the
prosecution.”); see also Covey, supra note 307, at 583 (providing evidence that the
prosecutorial use of certain types of known unreliable forensic evidence is correlated with
increased indicators of official misconduct).
348. See Bernstein, supra note 1, at 37-38 (“Daubert has not done much to alleviate the
problem of forensic science quackspertise . . . . These problems demand resolution before
one can conclude that the Daubert revolution is complete.”).
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particular, are simply invalid. Hair analysis, fingerprint identification,
bite mark analysis are only the tips of the iceberg. Until courts
prosecutors commit themselves to their respective obligations
gatekeepers to preserve the integrity of the science used to convict,
criminal justice system will continue to be overrun with “junk science.”
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